The Forced War
by David Hoggan
Opposed to the war are: The populations of all European nations, the population of the U.S.
and the leaders of almost all European nations including Germany.
In favor of war: Roosevelt, Stalin and several Zionist leaders of Britain and Poland.
Although the description of events is lengthy, understanding the detail is the only way to undo a lifetime of programming, propaganda and lies about the cause of the outbreak of history’s largest war.
The 1961 book The Forced War is the most well researched and comprehensive book ever written with regard to detailing the events which led up to and caused the breakout of World War II. Author David Hoggan leaves no stone unturned in documenting the events leading up to the war.
There are dozens of books by authors at the time which prove the Zionist version of events false,but perhaps none more detailed than The Forced War.
There are dozens of books by authors at the time which prove the Zionist version of events false,but perhaps none more detailed than The Forced War.
These excerpts show the extraordinary lengths taken to avoid war, by Hitler and everyone except a small handful of British Zionists.
____
____
In laying the groundwork to justify an attack on Germany, early in 1939 British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax inundates U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt with lies and propaganda to portray Hitler as a dire threat, even as Hitler is going around Europe offering peace to every leader.
Halifax tells Roosevelt on 1/24/39 that he has received:
“a large number of reports from various reliable sources which throw a most disquieting light on Hitler’s mood and intentions….
Hitler had recently planned to establish an independent Ukraine, and that he intended to destroy the Western Powers in a surprise attack before he moved into the East. Not only British intelligence but “highly placed Germans who are anxious to prevent this crime ‘had furnished evidence of this evil conspiracy…’
…Roosevelt was informed by Halifax that Hitler might seek to push Italy into war in the Mediterranean to find an excuse to fight. This was the strategy which Halifax himself hoped to adopt by pushing Poland into war with Germany. Halifax added that Hitler planned to invade Holland, and to offer the Dutch East Indies to Japan. He suggested to Roosevelt that Hitler would present an ultimatum to Great Britain, if he could not use Italy as a pawn to provoke a war. Halifax added casually that the British leaders expected a surprise German attack from the air before the ultimatum arrived. He assured Roosevelt that this surprise attack might occur at any time. He claimed that the Germans were mobilizing for this effort at the very moment he was preparing this report.
The British Foreign Secretary reckoned that Roosevelt might have some doubt about these provocative and mendacious claims. He hastened to top one falsehood with another by claiming that an “economic and financial crisis was facing Germany” which would compel the allegedly bankrupt Germans to adopt these desperate measures. He added with false modesty that some of this ‘may sound fanciful and even fantastic and His Majesty’s Government have no wish to be alarmist.'”
The same strategy is used on Poland by the Zionist British leaders:
“The British leaders made another futile attempt to persuade [Polish Foreign Minister Joseph] Beck to transform the Polish-Rumanian alliance from an anti-Soviet pact into an anti-German pact. Beck replied that he opposed this plan.
The British leaders did not like Beck’s response. They wished him to think exclusively in terms of destroying Germany, and to forget other considerations. In other words, they wished his thinking to be more similar to that of President Roosevelt in the United States. They began to employ the same propaganda methods on Beck which they used with Roosevelt. They began to suggest a number of hypothetical situations with their usual formula of saying “this may sound fantastic, but ‘what would you do in such and such a case.’ Beck put a stop to this by declaring bluntly that ‘it was against the tradition of the Polish Government to express definite opinions about third countries without directly consulting them.’
Beck did not like this English style of rumor-mongering. He was convinced that this assertion of alleged German designs against Hungary was entirely false. He wished that the British leaders would desist from their efforts to alarm him in this way. He assured the British leaders with studied emphasis that he was entirely convinced Germany was not planning any political action outside her present frontiers except at Danzig.
Halifax soon concluded that the tactics which were effective with President Roosevelt could produce no effect on Beck. This was true because Beck was much better informed about European affairs than President Roosevelt and his advisers.”
The British need to use care to start a war Germany doesnt want, while making it appear Germany is the cause of the war and at the same time dragging in France:
“…It was conceivable that Halifax could lead Great Britain into a war which began with a surprise Polish invasion of Germany, but the Polish leaders knew that France and the United States were also of decisive importance to British policy.
The Poles knew that Halifax would never support Poland unless he could drag France into war. This policy was dictated by the simple fact that Halifax did not believe Great Britain could win a war against Germany without the participation of France.
The Poles also knew that it would be difficult for President Roosevelt to arouse the American people against Germany unless it was possible to maintain that Poland was the innocent victim of German aggression… ”
Atrocities against Germans living in the Danzig corridor continue to increase throughout 1939:
“Polish provocation of Germany after March 31, 1939, was frequent and extreme, and Hitler soon had more than a sufficient justification to go to war with Poland on the basis of traditional practices among the nations. Nevertheless, Hitler could not justify German action, unless he believed that he was prepared to meet the consequences. He hoped to avoid war with Great Britain, and he knew that he would run a grave risk of an Anglo-German war if he invaded Poland. It was for this reason that German-Polish relations became progressively worse over a long period before they produced a conflict.
German Dr. Rudolf Wiesner…addressed an appeal to [Polish} Premier Slawoj-Skladkowski from Bielitz, East Upper Silesia, on May 25, 1939. He complained about the current wave of mass arrests of the members of his organization, and he submitted a long list of individuals who had been arrested for no apparent reason. He informed the Premier that he was asking for protection on the basis of the loyal attitude of his group.
The new wave of Polish excesses against the German minority in Poland, after the Beck speech, infuriated Germany without impressing the British leaders, who were aware of them, or the British public, which was uninformed.
The [German] Danzigers were convinced that Poland would show them no mercy if she were permitted to obtain the upper hand.
The Danzig Government presented two protest notes to the Poles on July 29, 1939, concerning illegal activities of Polish customs inspectors and frontier officials. The Danzig Government objected to hostile Polish economic measures and threatened to undertake reprisals. The Polish Government ignored this warning, and on August 1, 1939, it terminated the export of duty-free herring and margarine from Danzig to Poland, although the sale of these items to Poland constituted 10% of the total trade of the Free City.
It was pointed out that the number of Polish customs inspectors, before the recent increase, was 400% above the 1929 level, although the trade of Danzig remained much smaller in 1939 than it had been ten years earlier. The cost of the increased number of inspectors was carried exclusively by the impoverished Danzig community.
Senate President Greiser received official notification in the early hours of August 5, 1939, that the frontiers of Danzig would be closed to the importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig Government promised by 6:00 p.m. the same day, never to interfere with the activities of Polish customs inspectors. The threat was formidable, because Danzig produced a relatively small proportion of her own food. Greiser was informed that every Polish customs inspector would bear arms while performing his duty after August 5, 1939.
[Polish Commissioner] Marian Chodacki concluded many years later that the Polish ultimatum of August 4th (dated August 4th, presented August 5th) was a serious tactical mistake. It was not based on any specific incident or hostile act of the Danzig Government.”
Despite Polish abuses in Danzig, Hitler offers concessions to keep the peace:
“Hitler concluded that Poland was seeking to provoke an immediate conflict with Germany. He advised Greiser to capitulate at once… Greiser contacted Chodacki on the morning of August 5th to inform him that Danzig submitted to the Polish ultimatum. He reminded the Polish High Commissioner that no order for interference with the Polish customs inspectors had been issued by the Danzig Government.
He expressed astonishment that Chodacki had threatened to starve Danzig for no apparent reason, and he protested against the new Polish directive which provided for the total militarization of the Polish customs inspectors in Danzig….
Poland responds with hostility and threats, and ends negotiations for no reason:
“…The German Government was warned that Poland would consider further German intervention against Polish interests at Danzig an act of aggression. The Polish Government disclaimed responsibility for the consequences which would ensue if the German Government persisted in its efforts to protect Danzig….
The German Government was further informed that Polish willingness to discuss Danzig with Germany in the past had been a voluntary gesture of good will on the part of Poland, which the Polish Government was no longer willing to permit.”
Roosevelt, who fully intends to enter the war 2 years before doing so, is concerned that the American public will wise up to the grand deception and discover that Germany is not the aggressor:
“American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris informed President Roosevelt on August 3, 1939, that Beck was predicting that an intense and decisive phase of the crisis between Germany and Poland might occur before August 15, 1939. President Roosevelt knew that Poland was obviously to blame for the crisis which began at Danzig on August 4th, and he was alarmed at the prospect that the American public might learn the truth about the situation. This could be a decisive factor in discouraging his program for American military intervention in Europe.
He instructed Under-Secretary Sumner Welles on August 11, 1939, to order American Ambassador Biddle to advise the Poles about this problem. President Roosevelt urged the Poles to be more clever in making it appear that German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at Danzig.
The response of Beck to American intervention was not encouraging. Biddle reported to President Roosevelt, at midnight on August 11th, that the Polish Government had decided that there could be absolutely no concessions to Germany. Beck was obviously unwilling to engage in a series of elaborate but empty maneuvers which might have been useful in deceiving the American public. Beck wished the American President to know that he was content at the moment to have full British support for his policy.
It was apparent to the German Government that the British and French were either unable or unwilling to restrain the Polish Government from arbitrary steps which could produce an explosion.
The alternatives in this situation would be the abandonment of German aspirations at Danzig or war. “
Running out of options for peace, Germany requests help from the League of Nations:
[International governing body League of Nations] High Commissioner Jacob Burckhardt believed that Poland was utterly wrong in her claim that the Danzig Government had no right to restrict the activities of the Polish customs inspectors to specific areas based upon the existing agreements.
He had received detailed information from Germany on August 3, 1939, about Hitler’s instructions for an effort to end the friction with Poland at Danzig. Burckhardt discussed the question of the customs inspectors with [Polish Commissioner] Chodacki, but he admitted to [German leader at Danzig] Albert Forster that he had received a very unfriendly reception. He added that the Polish High Commissioner was not interested in the attempt of Hitler to exert a moderating influence on Danzig.
It proved impossible for the Polish state, which Pilsudski had created, to survive the consequences of the foreign policy pursued by Jozef Beck. The Polish state was heading for a war which was entirely unnecessary. Beck was deliberately gambling on the unlikely possibility that the inevitable defeat of Poland, in the early phase of the war, would be temporary because the Halifax war policy would provide for the destruction of both Germany and the Soviet Union….
He ignored the fact that Halifax and the other British leaders were coldly indifferent about the future of Poland, and that they would not fail to sacrifice Polish interests whenever it was considered expedient to do so. Poland was useful to Halifax in fomenting a war against Germany, but that was all….
This was solely because Halifax wanted war. The British Government under normal circumstances would have denounced the diplomacy of Beck in scathing terms. Beck would have received the warning that further steps of this kind meant the end of British obligations to Poland, had the British Government favored peace.
Poland had a unique and valuable mission to perform for Europe as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Her commitment to the war policy of Lord Halifax was the main obstacle to the successful performance of this mission in 1939.”
Russia’s is pleased to learn that the western powers while are fighting on behalf of communism, despite publicly pretending to oppose it:
“The Soviet leaders hoped for a conflict between Germany and the Western Powers which would exhaust the capitalist states and create conditions favorable for the expansion of Bolshevism.
The Soviet leaders had feared that Great Britain, France, and the United States would frustrate this hope by doing everything possible to promote an isolated war between Germany and the Soviet Union. (This would have seemed the logical policy from the standpoint of nations allegedly opposed to both Communism and Fascism.)
The Soviet leaders were delighted by the apparent determination of Halifax, after March 1939, to foment an Anglo-German War with or without the participation of the Soviet Union. This was the greatest contribution he could possibly make to the realization of Communist goals.”
Germany continues to appeal to the League of Nations to stop the abuses of Germans by the Polish; Britain’s only concern is decieving the outside world into beleiving Germany is the aggressor:
“Hitler told [League of Nations High Commissioner ]Jacob Burckhardt that further patience with the Poles was becoming an impossibility, and that grave danger existed of a German-Polish war. He predicted that Germany would defeat Poland in about three weeks if war came. He requested Burckhardt to inform the French and British of this situation, and to remind them that Germany did not desire a conflict with the Western Powers under any circumstances. Burckhardt agreed to undertake this mission.
Jozef Beck was nervous about this meeting, because he feared that Burckhardt would make a formidable effort to persuade the British and French not to attack Germany. He told [Polish diplomat] Szembek that he was furious with Burckhardt for accepting an interview with Hitler at this juncture.
Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary…received some plain language from Burckhardt about the atrocious mistreatment of the German minority by the Poles.
Halifax responded …that the Poles would have to improve their tactics if they hoped to avoid giving any impression that they were guilty of provoking the approaching war. Halifax also advised the Poles to cease their provocations at Danzig and to restrain their press. The Polish Foreign Minister was relieved to note that the Burckhardt mission had failed to modify British policy.”
Italy recommends an international conference to find a peaceful solution, and offers its support to Germany:
“[Italian Foreign Minister ]Galeazzo Ciano and Ribbentrop met with Hitler on the Obersalzberg in the afternoon for an intensive conference of more than three hours. Ciano insisted that a war with Poland should be avoided at any price, and he suggested that the Axis should issue an appeal for an international conference…
Hitler inquired what Ciano would do if Trieste were in Yugoslav hands, and if a large Italian minority were subjected to persecution on Yugoslav soil.
The German Chancellor thought that the danger of a general war in such a situation might discourage decisive action, but he added that it was his definite conviction that Great Britain and France, whatever their threats now, would not precipitate a general war.
Ciano argued that Great Britain and France would attack Germany despite a Russo-German agreement. He claimed that a war at this moment would be highly advantageous for the Western Powers.
He predicted that a war in 1939 would deal a catastrophic blow to German and Italian relations with the United States, because it would enable [the communist] President Roosevelt to obtain a third presidential term of office.
Ciano predicted that Roosevelt would lose his political game of exploiting foreign crises to advance his position at home if war could be averted at least until after the American presidential election in November 1940. Ciano was convinced that the temporary unity of opinion in Great Britain and France would gradually disintegrate if there were no war….Ciano promised Hitler that Italy would maintain a common front with Germany.
The American ambassador, who is unaware of Roosevelt and the Zionists’ plans for war at any cost, searches for peaceful solutions and is surprised to find Britain and Poland uninterested in them:
“American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy at London…suggested that it would be logical to respond to the [German pact with] Russia by seeking a peaceful settlement with Germany, but Halifax replied stiffly that “my reason shows me no way out but war.” This was because Halifax favored war with Germany at any price, and it was evident to Kennedy that he was impervious to reasonable proposals for peaceful negotiations….
Kennedy personally hoped that Poland would finally agree to resume negotiations with Germany, and he was disappointed to discover that neither Halifax nor Chamberlain was prepared to urge the Poles to adopt this course. He was convinced that Warsaw rather than Berlin constituted the chief menace to peace. He suggested to the American State Department that if President Roosevelt “is contemplating any action for peace, it seems to me the place to work is on Beck in Poland and to make this effective it must happen quickly. I see no other possibility.”
A Zionist American reporter fabricates cartoonish propaganda portraying composed and rational German leaders as rabid for war; The British ambassador stationed in Germany says Hitler wants war less than anyone in Germany.
“Hitler received the German military leaders at the Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939. He discussed the situation with them in morning and afternoon conferences…
One version of these conferences was presented by Louis P. Lochner of the American Associated Press to British diplomats at Berlin on August 25, 1939. This material was later cited by a number of historians as a valid record of the conferences, and it consciously or unconsciously influenced the thinking of British diplomats at the time. Otherwise, it would have been dismissed as something too ridiculous to receive serious consideration. The crass propaganda in the material would have been immediately discarded had people been permitted to think normally about important issues. Unfortunately, a furious and uninterrupted war propaganda campaign had been carried on in the West for more than five months, and nearly everyone, regardless of his mental caliber, had been seriously affected.
Why would anyone believe that Marshal Göring danced on the table and shrieked like a savage before a group of austere German Generals? Why would Hitler blandly announce to his Generals that “Göring had demonstrated to us that his Four-Year Plan is a failure and that we are at the end of our strength, if we do not achieve victory in a coming war?” This sounded more like a leaf from the book of President Roosevelt, who, unlike Hitler, was still facing a catastrophic depression. The statement would be sheer nonsense when applied to war with poverty-stricken Poland. Every informed person, including Lord Halifax, knew that Göring was the last person in Germany who would deliver arguments in favor of a general war at this time.
The memorandum stated that Hitler told his Generals he planned to kill the Polish women and children. This would have been proper material for an American “comic book,” and also for Hitler, if his purpose had been to goad his Generals into an immediate revolt against the German regime.
Succinct and reliable references to the meetings of August 22, 1939, are available from the actual participants. The traditions of popular journalism cannot excuse people, from any country, who seek to precipitate wars by spreading lies when feeling is running high.”
“[British ambassador ] Nevile Henderson was particularly irritated by repeated claims in the British press that Hitler had been intimidated by the firm support other Powers were giving to the Poles. He predicted that ‘history will judge the Press generally to have been the principal cause of the war.’
The press, with its vile and irresponsible tactics during this period, was undoubtedly an important factor, but Henderson failed to note that the worst phase of the press campaign in Great Britain followed inevitably from the distorted and dishonest official British version of the events at Prague in March 1939, and from the fantastic Tilea hoax, which had been deliberately perpetrated by Halifax and Vansittart to arouse the British public.
The British Ambassador was confusing cause and effect when he assigned the principal blame for the current crisis to the Western press.
Henderson pointed out that an Anglo-German agreement was necessary for German security, and he reminded Halifax that he was quite convinced Hitler sincerely desired such an agreement.
It seemed obvious to Henderson that a few resolute steps by Halifax could produce a satisfactory settlement, because ‘of all Germans, believe it or not, Hitler is the most moderate so far as Danzig and the Corridor are concerned.’
He charged that the British Embassy in Warsaw deliberately refused to recognize the actual desperate situation of the German minority in Poland.
He observed with keen insight that ‘Warsaw with its civilized and intelligent, not to say astute clique with which one consorts there, is one thing. Outside in the country the Poles are an utterly uncivilized lot.’
Halifax responded by informing Henderson that British determination to support Poland could not be influenced by Hitler’s diplomacy. He reiterated his favorite theme that he was doing everything to avoid war simply by making the British position clear.”
Hitler writes an appeal to the Prime Minister of Britain as Polish atrocities against Germans mount:
“The German Foreign Office took stock of its huge file of specific reports of excesses against national and ethnic Germans in Poland. More than ten detailed reports were arriving each day, and more than 1,500 documented reports had been received since March 1939. They presented a staggering picture of brutality and human misery.
The Polish Government on August 25th dealt with a German protest that three German civilian airplanes carrying passengers and flying over the Baltic Sea had been fired upon by Polish batteries on the Hela peninsula. The Poles admitted firing on only one German airplane on August 24th, and they claimed that it had been sighted flying over Polish territory prior to the Polish attack.
Hitler’s letter to Chamberlain on August 23, 1939, placed principal emphasis on the intensity of suffering among the Germans of Poland…
He also accused [Britain] of encouraging war between Poland and Germany by presenting the Poles with a blank check for British support in any conflict, regardless of its origin…
Great Britain had encouraged Polish intransigence by stating that she would support Poland in any conflict against Germany. Hitler concluded that this situation would destroy his life-long ambition to promote Anglo-German friendship and understanding.
Mussolini recognized that Hitler had a mystical faith that wisdom would prompt the British leaders to avoid the tragedy of a new Anglo-German conflict. Mussolini wished it to be clearly understood in Germany that he did not share this faith despite the recent success of German policy in Russia.”
A British politician, unaware of Zionist British commitment to war at any cost, assumes war can be easily prevented. Also unware that the map of Europe was redrawn to intentionally create conflicts after WW1, he heads to Germany to explore options for peace, with the idea that lands cans simply be restored to the countries they were taken from.
“Charles Roden Buxton, the Labour Party foreign policy expert and Quaker leader, arrived at Berlin on a visit on August 15, 1939…
Buxton announced that he was in Berlin to discuss an amicable settlement of Anglo-German friction.
The personal plan which Buxton presented contained everything which Hitler desired and much more than he would have requested in a settlement with Halifax. It began with the crucial point that the British Empire should disinterest itself in Eastern Europe after recognizing that the German Reich had special interests in that area.
Buxton advocated the return of the German colonies held by Great Britain and France, and the convening of an international colonial conference on the basis of the Berlin conference of 1885 for a rational redistribution of colonial territory among the leading colonial Powers. This did not mean that any particular Power would necessarily receive a net increase of colonial territory, but it was hoped that an exchange of territories in specific areas would reduce future points of friction. Buxton also advocated the liquidation of British economic imperialism in Eastern Europe, for instance in Rumania, where Great Britain exerted pressure on the local authorities for unfair concessions at the expense of normal trade.
He believed that it would be necessary for Great Britain to disavow her guarantees to Poland, Rumania, and Greece as the only means of terminating unwarranted British intervention in Eastern Europe. Buxton believed that the British Government should atone for their harmful influence in Poland by offering to mediate in the dispute between Poland and Germany. He advocated a program of mutual confidence which would include a new Anglo-German naval treaty, the reduction of armaments, and mutual inspection of the national military establishments in Great Britain and Germany.
It was obvious to the German diplomats that Buxton was presenting a very real and vital plan for the settlement of Anglo-German tension, and there were no German objections whatever to the points which he proposed. It was equally clear that the British Government would have accepted this program were Butler rather than Halifax responsible for the conduct of British foreign policy. The Buxton plan would have afforded a marvelous platform for a negotiated settlement had it been presented officially by the British Government. Hitler was aware that Buxton intended him to use these proposals in negotiations with the British Government, and he did not hesitate to do so after the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact.”
The behavior of British Parliament at this stage just before the outbreak of war, demonstrates:
(1) how little support there is for war among Britian’s elected leaders
(2) an alarming level of confusion in Parliament about the very basics of what was going on, even in the final days before a major war.
It was not the elected British Parliament who wanted war. It was a few carefully placed Zionists.
“The various Parliamentary factions displayed considerable confusion on August 24th. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, suggested that a possible attack against the British Empire should be the primary consideration of Chamberlain rather than the defense of Poland.
The Communist member, Gallacher, continued to insist that Great Britain should do nothing without a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.
The statement of Ernest Bevin, who spoke for the British Labour Party, was particularly interesting.
Bevin insisted that a British guarantee of Poland without support from the Soviet Union was a much too formidable undertaking. He suggested that the time had arrived for a solution of the Polish crisis by further negotiation.
The various factions are all confused about why peace can’t be negotiated in situation this simple.
…The policy of Halifax was calculated to destroy Germany rather than to permit that normal growth and development which for centuries had been considered the natural right of every nation. It was a policy which led to the destruction of a friendly Germany and to the domination of Europe by a hostile Union pledged to overthrow the capitalist system in Great Britain.”
In the final days leading up to war, the Swedish diplomat Dalherus attempts to show the British leaders how committed Germany is to peace.
“Birger Dahlerus submitted a careful memorandum at the British Foreign Office on August 25th about Göring’s remarks on the previous day.
Hitler wished for a peaceful settlement which would not sacrifice the national dignity of Germany recently regained after so great an effort. Göring had one main point to offer. If the British would reconcile themselves to a strong Germany on the European continent, Germany, in return, would aid, rather than oppose, the British Empire. Above all, Göring believed it was important that neither Power should intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbor.
Göring was convinced that two commercial spheres of respective economic concentration could be defined by the two trading nations.
Dahlerus insisted warmly that it was evident to him from his intimate knowledge of Germany ‘that the German nation as such certainly does not want a war, but desire to build up their own country and endeavour to establish a higher standard of living for the whole nation.’
Dahlerus concluded his first meeting with the British diplomats by reminding them of Göring’s promise that Hitler would come very far to meet any offer from Great Britain.”
Hitler meets with the British Ambassador to Germany, where he points out the absurdity of the fictional press stories about Germany’s desire for world conquest, and makes yet another peace offer, this time an offer to Britain of the full support and friendship of Germany. He offers to sign a guarantee that Germany will not pursue any actions to change the balance of power in Europe.
“Hitler had earlier requested British Ambassador Henderson to call at 1:30 p.m. to receive formal German proposals for an Anglo-German agreement. He received Henderson on schedule and informed him that the Danzig question would be settled, and that his pact with Russia precluded the danger of a Russo-German war. He reminded Henderson that he had no aspirations in Western Europe, and that he wished the British Empire to remain prosperous and strong. He added that the colonial problem could be relegated to the far-distant future, and he asserted that it would be unwise in any event to discuss such problems until Great Britain and Germany had reached an agreement for the reduction of armaments.
The German leader reminded the British Ambassador that his purpose in arranging the meeting was to present a formal offer for an Anglo-German agreement. Germany wished to follow up her treaty with Russia by concluding a treaty of friendship with Great Britain
He denied the charges of the British leaders that Germany entertained plans of world conquest. Hitler reminded Henderson that the integral parts of the British Empire comprised 40 million square kilometers of land. Germany occupied a modest area of less than 600,000 square kilometers. Many nations occupied formidable places between the top British position on the list of large Powers, and the German position farther down the list. For instance, the Soviet Union contained 19 million square kilometers, and the United States of America 9 million square kilometers. Hitler refused to concede that any German plans to conquer the world could be feasible.
Hitler told Henderson that this did not change the fact that Germany faced an acute problem in her own immediate neighborhood. He was determined to regulate conditions in a part of the area lost by Germany twenty years earlier, and this meant Danzig and the Corridor. The only possible result Hitler could see from the Prime Minister’s speech of the previous day was a bloody and incalculable war. He was prepared to take every possible step to avert this catastrophe, and he was now presenting terms for the comprehensive agreement with Great Britain which he had always desired. His offer was predicated on the assumption that Great Britain would be willing to recognize German obligations to Italy just as Germany accepted British obligations to France.
He was prepared to proceed along the lines of the Buxton plan, and to assume the greatest and most complex commitment on behalf of Great Britain that had ever been offered by any foreign political leader. This commitment was no less than his willingness to place the entire power of the Reich at the disposal of the British for the defense of the British Empire at any point and any time. The British leaders themselves, of course, would be free to decide in any threatening situation when and if they needed this aid. Hitler believed that an arrangement of Anglo-German differences would create conditions of complete security for both Powers, and it was obvious that a drastic reduction of armaments would be immediately feasible. He was willing to sign a guarantee at once that Germany desired no change in the status quo throughout Western Europe. Hitler added delicately that, if his proposals failed and war ensued, Great Britain would not emerge as a stronger Power, whatever the outcome. He declared that the vital interests of Germany required him to make his entire offer conditional on a settlement of the German-Polish dispute along lines acceptable to Germany.
Henderson desired an Anglo-German agreement, and he was deeply moved by his meeting with Hitler on August 25, 1939. The British Ambassador offered a number of personal observations when he relayed Hitler’s remarkable offer to Halifax and Chamberlain.
Henderson warmly recommended to Halifax that Hitler should be given an opportunity to demonstrate his good intentions.
The Anglo-Polish alliance treaty of August 25, 1939, contained a secret protocol which provided that the treaty would be applied exclusively against Germany. The London Times carried a story on the morning of August 25th from their Berlin correspondent to the effect that a German-Polish war would inevitably produce the annexation of extensive Polish territories by the Soviet Union. The first official revelation that the British Government was not obliged to defend Poland against the Soviet Union was made by Rab Butler in the House of Commons on October 19, 1939, more than one month after the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union. By that time the British were fully embarked on their campaign against Germany inspired by their alleged desire to defend the territorial integrity of Poland. The British merely agreed to consult with the Poles in the event of aggression against Poland by the Soviet Union.
(Despite all the lies and rewritten history about the causes of World War 2, who was responsible and why, this point exposes the truth to all who are interested.
Britain only pretended to support Poland under the flimsy pretext of preventing innocent Poles being attacked. When in fact the only purpose of the alliance with Poland was to embolden the Polish to escalate atrocities against Germans and create the conditions for a large conflict. As soon as they got their war on Germany kicked off, instantly the “innocent” Poles didn’t matter and Russia was permitted to annex eastern Poland.)”
More atrocities from Poland, more offers from Germany to negotiate:
“The news of the Anglo-Polish Pact persuaded Hitler that the British might attack Germany despite the German treaty with Russia. He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he retreated, the Germans of the East, including Danzig, would be abandoned to the cruelty and arrogance of a hostile Poland. If he took effective action against the Poles, the British might unleash another general European War.
Halifax received two urgent appeals from Henderson shortly before the Polish treaty was signed. The British Ambassador stated frankly in his first message that he favored the acceptance of Hitler’s offer for an agreement. He urged Halifax to give the German proposals serious consideration. The second message reported a major atrocity against the Germans in Poland which had taken place on the same day. Henderson never relied on official German information concerning these incidents, and he was basing his report on confirmation which he had received from neutral sources. The latest atrocity had taken place at Bielitz, East Upper Silesia. The Poles were forcibly deporting the Germans of that area, and compelling them to march into the interior. Eight Germans were murdered and many more were injured during one of these actions on August 25, 1939. Henderson feared that the Bielitz atrocity would be the final straw to prompt Hitler to invade Poland. He made no secret of the fact that he deplored the failure of the British Government to exercise restraint over the Polish authorities.
Hitler had invited French Ambassador Robert Coulondre to call on him at 5:30 p.m. on August 25th. Hitler met the French Ambassador on schedule and described the latest incidents against the Germans in Poland.
Hitler assured Coulondre that he wished to avoid war with France. Nevertheless, he exclaimed: “I will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it through to the bitter end.
Hitler requested Coulondre to convey these sentiments to French Premier Daladier.
Coulondre also gave Hitler his word of honor that France would now do everything within her power to compel the Poles to moderate their policies. Hitler replied: “I believe you; I even believe that men like M. Beck are moderate, but they are no longer in control of the situation.”
The new German offer to Poland on August 29, 1939, was the most important development during the several days after Hitler’s decision of August 25, 1939, for a last diplomatic campaign to settle the German-Polish dispute. The terms of a new German plan for a settlement, the so-called Marienwerder proposals, were not disclosed to the Poles until August 31, 1939, and they were less important than the offer to negotiate as such. The terms of the Marienwerder proposals were essentially nothing more than a tentative German plan for a possible settlement.
The Germans, in offering to negotiate with Poland, were announcing to the world that they favored a diplomatic settlement over war with Poland. The Poles, in refusing to negotiate, were announcing that they favored war. The refusal of Halifax to encourage the Poles to negotiate indicated that the British Foreign Secretary also favored war. He chose to ignore Hitler’s offer to accept the British guarantee of Poland once the Danzig dispute was settled by negotiation. The important thing would have been for the Poles to resume negotiations, and to permit the opening of the door which Beck had closed without any adequate reason in his speech of May 5, 1939. The willingness of the Poles to negotiate would not have implied their readiness to recognize the German annexation of Danzig, nor would it in any way have implied a Polish retreat. The Poles could have motivated their acceptance with the announcement that Germany, and not Poland, had found it necessary to request new negotiations.
Beck undoubtedly would have adopted a different attitude toward the situation had Halifax insisted that he agree to compromise with Germany. The greatest worry at the Polish Foreign Office for several days after August 25, 1939, was that the British would change their minds about attacking Germany, and decide at the last moment not to honor their obligations to Poland. It was natural for Beck to conclude under these circumstances that it would be wise to provoke a conflict with Germany as soon as possible, and before the British leaders changed their minds.”
The buffoon Roosevelt suggests fomenting a revolution inside Germany, and promises to deceive the American public into the war when the time comes:
“President Roosevelt designed to facilitate a closer coordination of British and American policy against Germany. The American President suggested that everything possible should be done by propaganda to bring down the German regime in revolutionary chaos. Roosevelt believed that wireless propaganda should be broadcast to Germany around the clock. He expected that it would produce a great effect to argue in advance that Hitler would be solely responsible for any war. He hoped that the pacific desires of the German people might be exploited to undermine the loyalty of Germans toward their Government after the outbreak of war.
Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, addressed a series of final reports to Halifax:
The American President had damaged his prospects in May 1939 with his unsuccessful attempt to pull the teeth from the American neutrality laws, but he assured Lindsay that he would succeed in emasculating this legislation after the outbreak of war. He admitted that he would be forced to delay a new effort to do so “until war broke out.” The American President also promised that he would not actually abide by the neutrality laws if he was compelled to invoke them.
The British Ambassador was personally perturbed that the President of one of the important countries could be gay and joyful about a tragedy which seemed so destructive of the hopes of all mankind. He reported that Roosevelt spoke in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank. It was an American and world tragedy to have at this important juncture a President whose emotions and ideas could be rated by a friendly Ambassador as childish.
Halifax was inclined to regard the attitude of the American President as a product of one of the most successful British efforts in colonial propaganda.
The American President, who was an enthusiastic militarist, had accepted the idea of World War II as his best escape from the hopelessly unsuccessful policies with which he had failed to cope with the economic depression in the United States.”
France doesn’t want war either:
“Coulondre made a vigorous appeal for peace after Hitler had read the letter from Daladier. The French Ambassador insisted that a war fought with modern arms would above all be a great tragedy for the women and children of Europe. Coulondre noted that these carefully calculated words produced a great effect on Hitler. There was a long pause, after which the German Chancellor observed pensively: “Yes, I have often thought of the women and children.”
Hitler wrote a careful reply to Daladier, which Ribbentrop personally delivered to the French Ambassador on the following day. The French Ambassador was filled with new hope that there would be no war after his conversation with Hitler on August 26th.
The German Chancellor reminded Daladier that he was not seeking a quarrel with France, and that he had gladly renounced Alsace-Lorraine. He asked Daladier what his feelings would be if Marseilles, a French port city more than twice the size of Danzig, were converted to a Free City, and were forced to accept constant lawless acts and usurpations from a smaller neighboring Power.
Hitler requested Ribbentrop to extend a pledge to Coulondre, in response to the remark about the European women and children made by the French-diplomat the previous day. Hitler promised not to take the initiative, in the event of hostilities, in the waging of war against enemy civilians. This pledge was later strictly observed. It was rendered inoperative by the indiscriminate British bombing campaign over Germany which had been planned as early as 1936.
German Chargé d’Affaires Thomsen reminded Hitler on August 28th that Roosevelt would do everything he could to encompass the downfall of Germany. He predicted that Roosevelt would employ ruthless tactics to force active American participation in a European war despite opposition from American public opinion. Thomsen was convinced that American raw materials and machines would be made available to Great Britain and France immediately after the outbreak of war, and that this measure would be popular because it would aid in overcoming the extensive unemployment. Thomsen concluded that the existing American neutrality legislation would be either abrogated or circumvented.”
Swedish diplomat urges Britain to reconsider Hitler’s peace offers and concessions:
Birger Dahlerus, who was conducting an unofficial mission for Germany, had conferred in London with Halifax on August 25th and 26th…
“Halifax was unable to deny that Hitler’s response to Chamberlain’s letter of August 23, 1939, had reopened the official channels of negotiation
Dahlerus at last succeeded in contacting Marshal Göring at 8:00 p.m
Göring emphasized that the situation was extremely serious, and that an Anglo-German conference was very much to be desired. He added that it would be an asset of incalculable importance if the British decided to return a favorable response to the agreement offer which Hitler had given to Henderson that same afternoon.
Dahlerus informed Halifax of his conversation with Göring on the telephone the previous evening. Halifax presented Dahlerus with a personal letter to Göring, which recommended direct German negotiations with the Poles.
The British leaders assured Dahlerus on August 27th that a formal reply to Hitler’s offer would soon be made, and that, in the meantime, they were willing to convey informally the substance of their response.
The German Chancellor was extremely pleased with the results of the Dahlerus visit to London on August 27th. His most pressing question at this point was whether or not Halifax was willing to consider an eventual Anglo- German alliance. Hitler assured Dahlerus that he would be willing to accept the British commitment to Poland once Germany had settled her own differences with the Poles. He believed that the British would recognize that he had made an important concession when he ceased to regard their guarantee to Poland as an obstacle to an Anglo- German understanding. Hitler then raised the crucial point. He insisted that it was necessary for the British to persuade the Poles to negotiate with Germany. Otherwise nothing would be accomplished, war would be inevitable, and a favorable opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding would be lost.”
(The only reason the weak and overmatched Poles refuse to negotiate, and refuse to stop persecuting the Germans in Danzig, is the British guarantee of support.)
“Dahlerus immediately contacted the British diplomats in Berlin to inform them that he strongly endorsed Hitler’s response to Halifax’s suggestions.
Dahlerus also informed the British diplomats that Hitler was prepared to accept an international guarantee of Poland as part of any settlement. The Swedish engineer confided that Hitler was much impressed with what he regarded as British sincerity in seeking to compose Anglo-German differences.
Dahlerus noted in a special report to the British that Göring had made a very realistic suggestion on August 26th. The German Marshal insisted that Germany wanted only the facts from both Dahlerus and the British, and that no concern should be given to avoid the wounding of German feelings. Göring believed that this frankness was necessary if the serious obstacles to an Anglo-German understanding were to be cleared away successfully. Dahlerus assured Halifax that personal contact with Hitler had convinced him that the German Chancellor did not desire war.
Dahlerus believed that he had done everything possible to prompt the British to make constructive suggestions in their reply to Hitler. There was nothing further to do but wait for the test of the official British note.
The reply which Henderson carried to Germany was a most interesting document.
Halifax wished Hitler to know that the Polish Government had declared its willingness to negotiate directly with the German Government. It is surely an understatement to observe at this point that Halifax had displayed surprisingly small concern about verifying an allegedly sincere Polish declaration of such obvious importance. No doubt Halifax would have shown more care and energy in this matter had he actually desired a negotiated settlement of German-Polish differences.
Halifax would have ceased working for war and would have joined the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy in the search for peace had he believed his own words. This development alone would have been quite sufficient to save the entire situation.
The meeting between Hitler and Henderson on the night of August 28/29 took place in a very friendly atmosphere.
Hitler began to discuss the new proposals he was planning to offer Poland, and he knew that the British leaders had previously received considerable information about them from Dahlerus. Hitler admitted that he was sorely tempted to request revisions of the confusing Upper Silesian border, which ran through kitchens, bathrooms, barnyards and mines. Polish rule in Upper Silesia had been exceptionally harsh, and the Allied and Associated Powers had been particularly dishonest about their choice of methods to transfer this territory to Poland in the first place. Hitler said that he would not tempt fate by raising this issue, because he knew that any change in the status quo of the area now would seriously affect vital Polish economic interests.
Henderson hoped to encourage Hitler by recalling the traditional Anglo-German amity of the good old days. He cited a familiar schoolbook quotation from Prussian General Blücher to his troops on the eve of the battle of Waterloo in 1815: “Forward, my children, I have given my word to my brother Wellington, and you cannot wish me to break it.” Hitler, with a combined feeling of amusement and sadness, remarked that “things were different 125 years ago.” Henderson replied stoutly: “Not so far as England was concerned.” The German Chancellor refrained from further comment, and, after all, Henderson was right. The British (Zionists) were pursuing the same archaic balance of power theory in 1939 that had prompted their unrelenting wars against France from 1793 until the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815. It was merely an incidental feature that now Germany, and not France, suffered from the single-minded hostility of Great Britain (Zionism). This was merely because Germany, in the course of an evolution determined primarily by natural causes, had replaced France as the, leading Power in the European continental region west of Russia. This was the main reason for the change.
There was a brief interlude of very great optimism in Hitler’s immediate circle following the conversation with Henderson on the night of August 28/29 and the reception of the British note of August 28th. This optimism seemed fully justified by the unequivocal but utterly false British assurance that the Poles had been induced to agree to renewed direct negotiations.
It may be argued that Hitler and his entourage were extremely naive to believe any assurance which came from London. This was undoubtedly true, but it was simply not apparent to Hitler that the British had anything to gain by misrepresenting the Polish position.
Hitler, in his enthusiasm for the British Empire, was inclined to give the British leaders more credit for intelligence and integrity than they actually deserved.
Dahlerus had telephoned the British Foreign Office from Berlin at 7:00 a.m. on August 29th to inform Halifax that Hitler was optimistic about a peaceful settlement. Halifax received an angry warning from Beck shortly afterward that the Polish Government was contemplating new measures against Danzig. Beck complained that the Danzigers were displaying increasing reluctance to expedite the normal shipments of Polish goods from the Free City harbor into Poland. He was completely unaware that Halifax had assured Hitler that Poland was prepared to negotiate for a definitive settlement of the Danzig issue with Germany.
Henderson wired additional information to Halifax shortly after noon on August 29th about Germany’s forthcoming reply to Great Britain, and about her new proposals to the Poles. The British Ambassador announced that Hitler had decided not to raise the dangerous Upper Silesian question, and that he would restrict his proposals to Danzig and the Corridor region. Henderson added that Göring was anxious to receive some indication about the attitude of the Poles toward new negotiations. The Germans had decided to request the British Government to serve as intermediary in approaching the Poles.
Henderson warned London that Göring feared the Poles would be stubborn and “try to ruin Germany by being so obstructive that war would be inevitable.” Henderson emphasized again that Hitler was prepared to participate immediately in an international guarantee of any satisfactory results achieved in a new Polish-German negotiation.
Henderson was more anxious about the situation than Göring, because he had received no indication that the British Government had actually advised the Poles to negotiate. He knew that a terrible fiasco would result if Halifax failed to take steps at Warsaw.
He emphasized to the British Foreign Secretary that Hitler preferred a negotiated settlement to any war, including a local war. Above all, Hitler had admired the Poles too long to desire their destruction.”
Poland mobilizes troops amid German peace offers and efforts to negotiate:
“Within minutes of Henderson’s latest appeals on the 29th, which were ignored by Halifax, a telegraph arrived at London from Kennard. He wished to inform Halifax that the Polish Government had decided upon general mobilization. The Polish military plans stipulated that general mobilization would be ordered only in the event of a Polish decision for war. Halifax was primarily to blame for this rash Polish decision which made a German-Polish war virtually inevitable. He had failed to inform the Poles of Germany’s peaceful intentions…
It was difficult to criticize the Poles for reacting as they did to Halifax’s one-sided version of Göring’s disclosures.
Historians of all nations had attributed great importance to the sequence in which the various nations had mobilized at the outbreak of World War I. The fact that the Russians and the French had declared general mobilization before the Germans in 1914 was rightly considered a matter of very great importance. Halifax should have been able to foresee the inevitable consequences of his deceitful policy at Warsaw, yet he was irritated by the Polish decision. He knew that Germany would defeat Poland in a war, and he knew that the calling up of another half-dozen Polish divisions could not avert the debacle. The Poles would merely incur greater responsibility for starting war without preventing the ruin which would inevitably befall them in the event of war. Halifax had decided, with cool and deliberate calculation, to exert pressure on the Poles to delay their mobilization.”
Poland won’t discuss peace terms:
“Beck had received vague rumors that Poland might seriously be requested to resume negotiations with Germany, and he decided to head off any such step by disclosing in advance that the Poles would refuse to do so. Beck declared flatly to Kennard that he was unprepared to grant any concessions to the Germans, and therefore he saw no point in negotiations. He explained that he would not accept any part of the proposals which he had rejected earlier in March 1939. Halifax received this statement with evident satisfaction, and he deliberately neglected to address any further communications to Warsaw for a lengthy period. He knew that Kennard would stoutly support Beck’s fanatical intransigence.
These facts were unknown at Paris, Berlin, and Rome, where an atmosphere of increasing optimism prevailed. Halifax was also optimistic, but for the opposite reasons. The French, German, and Italian leaders hoped for peace. Halifax was reasonably certain that there would be war.
He had worked for war unceasingly during the past ten months, and he sensed that his triumph was close at hand. He failed to realize that his success would produce the eclipse of his own country. He ignored still another urgent telegram from Henderson that it would be in the vital interest of Poland to accept promptly a German invitation to negotiate. Halifax knew that the Poles would be doomed in the event of war, but he cared nothing for the fate of Poland.
Hitler by this time had approved the finishing touches on the German reply to Great Britain…He confirmed his desire for a peaceful settlement and his willingness to negotiate with the Poles. Hitler wished the British Government to advise Poland to send an emissary to Berlin on the following day, Wednesday, August 30th.
Dahlerus telephoned the British Foreign Office from Berlin a few minutes after Henderson had been received by Hitler. He wished Halifax to know that Hitler and Göring were very pleased by the British attitude toward Germany revealed in the British note of August 28, 1939. Dahlerus assured the British that the German reply would reach London the same evening. It was noted at London that the Swedish engineer was “very cheerful and exuberant.” He obviously believed that his labors were nearing a successful conclusion.
Halifax received a further communication from Kennard a few minutes after the call from Dahlerus. The British Ambassador confirmed the Polish decision to post general mobilization notices the following morning, and added that he had received the tart reminder that such notices could not be kept secret. Kennard had approved the Polish measure, despite the fact that Bonnet had instructed French Ambassador Noël to protest vigorously against general mobilization. Kennard minced no words in defending the Poles against possible criticism from Halifax.
Beck requested Kennard to inform Halifax that there was only one development which could prevent the Polish general mobilization scheduled for 8:00 o’clock, on the following morning. This would be an explicit statement from Hitler that Germany had abandoned Danzig once and for all, and that she would never again seek to improve her transit communications to East Prussia through the Polish Corridor. Beck announced that he was prepared to receive and study the full text of Hitler’s reply to Great Britain at any hour. Poland would proceed with her military measures unless Hitler retreated. Beck had previously made it perfectly clear that he would not negotiate with Germany.
Hitler engaged in a lengthy discussion with Henderson about the German note to Great Britain of August 29th.
Henderson departed from his conference with Hitler with the conviction that it would be possible to prevent a war between Germany and Poland. He contacted London at once, and he warmly recommended that the British Government make every effort to persuade the Poles to accept the German offer to negotiate on the exact terms laid down by Hitler. The British Foreign Office received the summary text of Hitler’s reply at 9:15 p.m. on August 29th. There was ample time for the British Government to contact Warsaw, and for the Poles to send an emissary to Berlin at any time on the following day.
A decisive warning from the British that he definitely would lose their support unless he negotiated would have prompted him to negotiate, but Halifax, who did not desire peace, had no motive to issue such a warning. Bonnet urged Beck to accept Hitler’s offer as soon as he heard about it, but he was unable to achieve anything at Warsaw without British support.
Hitler was optimistic because he was completely out of touch with the actual British position represented by Halifax and Kennard despite the efforts of Henderson and Dahlerus. Henderson emphasized to Halifax on the night of August 29th that he had inquired if Germany would negotiate with Poland on a basis of full equality. Hitler had replied promptly and with unmistakable emphasis: “Of course!” Hitler added that he would inform the British Government of his suggestions for a settlement with Poland either shortly before or after the arrival of a Polish emissary. Henderson assured Halifax that these terms would be moderate.
Henderson displayed his usual independence by approaching the Poles in Berlin without waiting for instructions from London. He urged Lipski before midnight on August 29th that Poland could and should send a special envoy to Berlin the following day. Lipski naturally informed Beck of this new development without delay, and the Polish Foreign Minister responded shortly after midnight by calling in Kennard. The British Ambassador was poorly equipped to discuss the situation, because he had received virtually no information from Halifax about the German reply to the British note of August 28th. Beck postponed his discussion with Kennard pending the arrival of adequate information from London.
Halifax had merely informed Kennard that Hitler’s reply “does not appear to close every door.” He might have added that Hitler was trying to open doors rather than to close them, and, above all, he was seeking to open the door slammed by Beck on May 5, 1939. There was a curious air of leisurely detachment in Halifax’s reaction to Hitler’s important offer. Halifax appeared to be more concerned in conveying his unreserved approval of Kennard’s arguments in support of the Polish general mobilization. Halifax made the cynical statement that Great Britain “could not take the responsibility of advising the Polish Government against any action which they consider necessary for their security.” This was really carrying the blank check policy to extremes. It obviously included acceptance of the Polish position that negotiations with the Germans also presented a threat to the security of Poland.
Halifax persisted in adding that the Poles should do everything possible “to avoid advertising” their general mobilization…”
British ambassador in Poland prevents peace talks:
“Halifax passed on to Kennard the full text of the German reply of August 29th shortly after midnight. He restricted himself to the vague comment that the German reply appeared to be not unpromising.
Kennard decided to advise Beck to reject Hitler’s offer for negotiations…He concluded melodramatically that Poland would sooner fight and perish than submit to such humiliation.
The fact that Hitler was willing to negotiate in the face of countless provocations from Poland made no impression on Kennard.
The situation at Warsaw was really quite incredible. Kennard knew that his Government had dishonestly assured Germany on August 28th that Poland was prepared to negotiate seriously with Hitler. Yet, it was unethical of Kennard even under these circumstances to advise Poland not to negotiate. This did not trouble either Halifax or Kennard. Halifax replied to Kennard later on August 30th that the Poles should desist from firing on the German minority, and should make some effort to restrain their reckless radio propaganda, which had been called to his attention at London. He expressed no disapproval of Kennard’s decision to urge Beck not to negotiate with Germany.
There was complete clarity at London, Paris, and Warsaw by the morning of August 30th about the latest German offer to Poland.
Hitler had appealed to the British to advise the Poles to accept direct negotiations with Germany. The British had responded by informing Germany on August 28th that Poland was prepared to negotiate.
Hitler informed Henderson on the following day that he was preparing tentative proposals for a settlement with Poland, and that he wished the British Government to invite Poland to send a special emissary to Berlin on August 30th
The British received an additional assurance shortly afterward that Germany would accept the arrival of a Polish envoy somewhat later than midnight August 30th, and that Berlin had merely been suggested for negotiations. It would be perfectly satisfactory to negotiate at some other place. The many and definite conciliatory steps taken by the German Government to avoid war with Poland during these days actually left very little to be desired.
The Germans on the early morning of August 30th were completely unaware of the situations at London and Warsaw. They did not realize that the August 28th British assurance of Polish readiness to negotiate was an inexcusable hoax. Halifax had neither requested nor received any indication from Poland that the Poles were willing to negotiate on a serious basis. The Germans did not realize that the Polish authorities at Warsaw on August 29th had decided to declare general mobilization on the following day, and that this step had been expressly approved by Halifax. They did not know that the British Ambassador at Warsaw had responded to the German offer to Poland of August 29, 1939, by advising the Poles not to negotiate with Germany. Indeed, Hitler did not suspect that Halifax was doing everything possible to promote war and nothing to prevent it. The German Chancellor would have abandoned his latest hope for a settlement with Poland much earlier had he been aware of the actual situation. It was completely hopeless to invite the Polish Government to negotiate when the British Government was urging them not to do so.
British diplomacy at Warsaw on August 29th and 30th was a dishonorable and mendacious violation of the assurance to Germany in the British note of August 28th. The British Government for several days had fostered the false impression that they favored direct negotiations between Poland and Germany. Their advice to the Poles not to negotiate was an act of brazen duplicity unhappily characteristic of the (Zionist) British diplomatic tradition, which was based on cynical ruthlessness toward friend and foe alike. The excellent opportunity for a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland was destroyed by Halifax’s diplomacy, and the doom of Poland was assured.
The British Government, despite their assurance to Germany on August 28th, had never seriously advised Poland to negotiate. Halifax left Hitler entirely in the dark about this most important item. Hitler naturally assumed that Poland was defying Great Britain by refusing to negotiate, and that Polish defiance would be construed at London as a breach of the Anglo-Polish alliance. He naturally assumed that Poland had broken her engagements to Great Britain by refusing to negotiate with Germany after having first promised to do so. In reality, the contention in the British note of August 28, 1939, that Poland had assured the British Government of her readiness to negotiate was, as we have seen, a deliberate deception. The iniquity of this deception was afterward compounded when the British Government refused to advise Poland to accept negotiations with Germany.
The general mobilization notices were posted throughout Poland by the afternoon of August 30, 1939. The news of this latest Polish challenge to Germany was officially confirmed in a report to Berlin from the German Embassy at Warsaw.
Poland’s own General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had formerly been the chief military collaborator of Pilsudski, told allied journalists four years later that it was the Polish general mobilization order which rendered inevitable the German-Polish war. In retrospect, Sosnkowski insisted that Hitler could do nothing further to avert the war after this event.”
Germany is still unaware on on August 30 that the British are preventing the Poles from negotiating:
“Göring contacted Dahlerus again at 1:15 p.m. after talking to Hitler. The German Marshal first referred to the German proposals, which were now completed. He assured Dahlerus that they were “fabulous (fabelhaft).” He wished to add that there was no intention at Berlin to submit the terms to the Poles for unconditional acceptance, because these proposals were merely intended as a basis for discussion.
Hitler was willing to permit a special representative from Poland to “fetch” the proposals and carry them to Warsaw. Hitler believed that this concession would meet any British objections about undue pressure without denying the Poles an opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to negotiate for a peaceful solution.
Hitler’s thoughtful suggestion was both reasonable and extremely practical, and Göring was pleased with this latest development. He believed that this would remove the last British objection to the specific program for negotiations which had been suggested by Hitler. He was amazed when Dahlerus telephoned at 3:00 p.m. that the British did not like Hitler’s new plan…
The British refusal to consider this vitally important concession came to Göring as an unexpected and discouraging blow.
At one stroke, Berlin’s optimism was challenged by new doubts and fears.
The news about the Polish general mobilization arrived shortly afterward.
The British Prime Minister Chamberlain recognized that the exchange of views between the German and British Governments during the week since August 23rd indicated that Hitler was genuinely desirous of achieving an Anglo-German understanding.
Indeed, this desire on the part of Hitler had been evident to the British leaders for the past six years.
Chamberlain admitted to U.S. ambassador Kennedy that it was the Poles, and not the Germans, who were unreasonable. Kennedy informed President Roosevelt: “frankly he (Chamberlain) is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans.”
Henderson made a number of futile attempts on August 30th to persuade Halifax that a Polish emissary should be sent to Berlin. He reminded Halifax that a Polish diplomat could fly to Berlin from Warsaw in 1 1/2 hours. The British Foreign Secretary refrained from comment, but he informed Henderson that Dahlerus would fly from London to Berlin on the evening of August 30th.
He added that the persistent Swede intended to arrive at the British Embassy before 10:30 p.m. with information about the British response to Hitler’s note of the previous day. Halifax carefully avoided giving any impression that the message would contain hopeful news.
Henderson responded by warning Halifax that outrages against the Germans in Poland were rapidly increasing in number, and that they constituted the most dangerous factor in the existing precarious situation. The British Ambassador suggested that Pope Pius XII would be willing to employ special nuncios in an effort to protect the minority by introducing at least some element of neutral intercession on their behalf. Halifax ignored this suggestion, but he informed Kennard at Warsaw that Great Britain wished to “deprive” Hitler of the excuse of outrages against the German minority as a “pretext” for employing force against Poland. Halifax added that the Polish leader should be urged to maintain “discipline.”
Henderson knew that Halifax was not responding effectively to his warnings about the consequences of Polish misconduct against the Germans. The British Ambassador decided to employ an elaborate argument in an effort to influence Halifax.
He argued that Hitler’s power thrived on the willingness of the outside world to tolerate and ignore the injustices inflicted on the Germans.
He wished Halifax to recognize that Hitler’s position in Germany was being strengthened because of the failure’ to protect the German minority in Poland. He claimed that it would be in the interest of Great Britain to intervene energetically on behalf of the minority, and to promote the settlement of the Corridor problem and the return of Danzig to Germany.
Henderson hoped to be absolved from the possible charge that he was one-sided in his approach, or failed to sympathize with the Poles. His various arguments failed to produce any effect, because Halifax was not interested in the attitude of Henderson toward Poland, and he was definitely hostile toward the project of restricting his campaign against Germany to mere ideological warfare. Halifax wished to discredit Hitler by forcing him to shed German blood in a disastrous war which would end in the defeat and ruination of Germany. Halifax believed that the sole effective method of opposing Hitler was to kill as many Germans as possible. He had employed clever propaganda to convert the majority of his countrymen to the same opinion.”
Press in France makes a last minute push to avert war:
“The French press on August 30, 1939, revealed a far greater interest in preserving peace than in killing Germans. Marcel Pays, the editor of L’Escelsior, pointed out that there would be a good chance for an agreement between Germany and Poland if the British could be prevailed upon to secure the consent of Poland to negotiations. Lucien Bourgues complained in Le Petit Parisien that the issue of peace or war was in doubt because the British were not going far enough in urging a peaceful settlement. Le Jour and L’Echo de Paris agreed that no chance for peace should be missed, no extended hand should be rejected, and no effort should be made to humiliate Germany. Yves Morvan reported for Le Journal from London that Hitler had been moderate and reasonable in his recent talks with the British and French envoys at Berlin. Le Figaro insisted that Hitler’s hesitation during the past six days was “an example of reason” rather than mere “caution, fear, or weakness.” Edith Bricon of La République deplored the fatalism about war in England and Poland, and she insisted upon the need to repeat to everyone concerned that possibilities for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problem still existed. Rene Gounin reminded the readers of La Justice that France was as ready as ever to negotiate with Germany.
French Foreign Minister Bonnet was shocked to learn that the Poles had proceeded to order general mobilization despite his efforts to restrain them. He continued to insist that the Poles send an envoy to Berlin. He requested Halifax to consider a plan to reduce tension by suggesting the withdrawal of German and Polish troops from the positions which both sides were occupying at the frontier. Bonnet failed to enlist the support of Halifax for this proposition, and he discovered that his various measures to influence the Poles were not effective without British support. He could not fail to note the contrast between his own efforts to improve the situation, and the almost complete inaction of Halifax.
French Ambassador Coulondre made a further effort at Berlin on August 30th to impress Lipski with the seriousness of the situation.
He insisted to Lipski that there was great internal opposition in Germany to war against France and Great Britain, and that a small amount of conciliation from the Polish side might make it possible to exploit this situation in order to avoid war,
Coulondre added that there would be no hope at all unless something was done from the Polish side in response to Hitler’s offer. The foreign diplomats at Berlin were in agreement that there was tremendous opposition to war in Germany. American Chargé d’Affaires Alexander C. Kirk flatly asserted in a report to President Roosevelt at 1:00 p.m. on the following day that the German people, like the American people, were opposed to war.”
Britain refuses to advise Poland to negotiate:
“Halifax sent fateful instructions to Henderson at 6:50 p.m. on August 30, 1939, which virtually destroyed the last chance of avoiding a German-Polish war. These instructions contained the British reply to the German note of August 29th. The British leaders categorically rejected Hitler’s proposal that they advise the Poles to send a representative to Berlin for direct German-Polish negotiations. Halifax, who had not consulted Warsaw in this important matter, condemned the German proposal, “which is wholly unreasonable.” It was the unpleasant duty of Henderson to tell Hitler, when the hour of midnight struck, that Great Britain flatly refused to advise the Polish Government to comply with the German plan.
Dahlerus reported on the early evening of August 30th, after discussing the situation with the British leaders, that “it was obvious that by that time the British Government had become highly mistrustful, and rather inclined to assume that whatever efforts they might make, nothing would now prevent Hitler from declaring war on Poland.” It was difficult to understand their mistrust, because they had received an uninterrupted series of encouraging statements about Hitler’s attitude from Henderson and Dahlerus. It was perfectly obvious from the German note of August 29th that Hitler preferred a peaceful settlement with Poland rather than war. The British leaders, in taking this position with Dahlerus, were claiming that they should sit with their hands in their laps and do nothing. There was not the slightest justification for this attitude. They quickly recovered their capacity for action when it became a question of extending a local German-Polish war into a general European war. It appeared that British diplomacy in 1939 was exclusively preoccupied with preparing and promoting war, and that it immediately ceased to function when confronted with the task of protecting the peace.
The British Embassy in Berlin was inundated at this time by Germans of all descriptions and from all walks of life. Henderson was swamped with assurances that the German people did not want war. The British Ambassador was told that there was fear and confusion in German military circles at the prospect of a general war. Other people assured him that they would continue to sympathize with Great Britain no matter what happened as a result of the present British stand. These people did not suspect that the man to whom they were confessing their anxiety no longer had the slightest influence over British policy. Henderson would have helped them by negotiating an understanding with Germany had he been in a position to do so, but he had realized for several days that he was powerless.
No one in the position of the British Ambassador could be blamed for desisting from further efforts to prevent war, but Henderson never stopped trying. It is this fact, combined with his unquestionable British patriotism and his determination to stand by his own country through thick and thin, regardless of the dreadful blunders of the British leaders, that make his mission to Berlin a study in courage. He tried every possible tactic to persuade Chamberlain to express his own views, and to encourage the British Prime Minister to resume leadership at the British Foreign Office before it was too late.”
Roosevelt is deeply concerned that war is taking to long to start and Americans may find out Hitler is the one trying to avoid war, which would create even less support for U.S. involvement in the war, and cause vital Zionist interests [war] to be abandoned:
“Meanwhile The American President insisted that “the most serious danger from the standpoint of American public opinion would be if it formed the conclusion that Herr Hitler was entangling the British Government in negotiations leading to pressure on Poland by England and France to abandon vital interests.”
It was obvious to Lothian that Roosevelt wanted war in Europe.
The American President knew that a diplomatic settlement of the European crisis would extinguish his own plans for American military aggression in Europe…
Lothian knew that Roosevelt would never object to a later effort by Great Britain to massacre the civilian population of Germany by means of mass bombing attacks.
Roosevelt confided to Lothian that his primary objective at the moment was to evade American neutrality legislation after the outbreak of war. He was intent on renewing the struggle in the American Congress to remove the legal embargo on war material.
He promised that he would refuse to admit from the very start of hostilities that aluminum sheets for airplanes were “aeroplane parts” or that airplane engine blocks had anything to do with airplanes. Lothian confirmed the report of his predecessor that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. This warlike attitude of Roosevelt was exploited by Halifax in adducing artificial arguments for closing the door on further negotiations with Hitler. There was actually no reason to fear that President Roosevelt would be in a position to cause trouble for Great Britain in the event of a negotiated settlement in Europe. The American President did not have the support of Congress or public opinion for his aggressive foreign policy, and he was nearing the end of his final presidential term…”
Britain makes a final rejection of German requests for peace talks: Detailed peace plan is read to the British ambassador in Germany:
“Hitler placed high hopes in the news that the British Government intended to reply to his note of the previous
day, before midnight on August 30th.
Henderson was received by Ribbentrop at midnight on August 30th. The fatal British note which Ribbentrop read at once began as follows: “His Majesty’s Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government s desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement.” The British note displayed no interest whatever in persuading the Poles to negotiate with Germany. The German Foreign Minister studied the British reply with dismay.
He informed Henderson after reading the text that the German Government had prepared proposals for a diplomatic settlement with Poland.
The German Foreign Minister proceeded to read slowly and clearly the sixteen points of the German proposals to Poland, and to explain each one of them in detail. The fallacy of the wartime legend about proposals read indistinctly at top speed was exposed after 1945. The German points were comprehensive and formulated with great care.
They requested a mutual Polish-German agreement to protect the rights of the respective minorities. An international tribunal would be established to guarantee the efficacy of this scheme. It would have final jurisdiction in the consideration of appeals. The sixteenth point suggested that Poland and Germany should examine additional means of securing friendly cooperation.
The total extent of the area involved in the German proposals, including the Free City of Danzig and the plebiscite zone, amounted to only one-tenth of the region that Germany had surrendered in the East to Poland and the League of Nations after World War I.”
(They asked for 10% back of what had been stolen 2 decades earlier. Imagine the horror.)
“Dahlerus accompanied Henderson and Ogilvie-Forbes to the Polish Embassy in Berlin at 10:00 a.m. on August 31st. Dahlerus carried his copy of the German proposals, and he read them to Lipski in German. The Swedish engineer received the impression that the Polish Ambassador did not grasp their import, and he left the room to dictate a copy of the note to a Polish secretary. Henderson in the meantime telephoned Weizsäcker at the German Foreign Office that he was advising the Polish Ambassador to negotiate with Germany, and he called this his personal démarche at Warsaw. He proceeded to explain to Lipski that the German proposals offered an excellent basis for a settlement between Germany and Poland. He added that it might still be possible to save the situation if Lipski would agree to receive them.
…Lipski exclaimed to Henderson in great agitation that he “had no reason to negotiate with the German Government. If it came to war between Poland and Germany, he knew — since he had lived 5 1/2 years in Germany — that a revolution would break out in Germany, and that they would march on Berlin.”
Henderson shook his head sadly. He knew that there was no longer any point in discussing the current situation with the Polish Ambassador.
Mussolini, who was not adequately informed about the existing situation, had received the impression from London that Poland had agreed to negotiations. He was soon informed by Mackensen that conditions were entirely different that he had supposed. The Marienwerder proposals were sent to Mackensen in Rome at 10:53 a.m. on August 31st, shortly before the visit of Attolico at the German Foreign Office. Mussolini was impressed with the German plan for a settlement, and he instructed Attolico to advise the German leaders to receive Lipski as a last means of establishing contact. Ribbentrop and Attolico discussed the message on the afternoon of August 31st. The German Foreign Minister assured Attolico that the German leaders were as eager to receive the Polish Ambassador on August 31st as they had been on the previous day.
Kennard informed Halifax on the afternoon of August 31st that Beck had formally expressed his gratitude for the British decision not to respond in any way to the German proposals. French Foreign Minister Bonnet found the dilatory tactics of the Poles unjustifiable and inexplicable. He insisted to Halifax that a joint step should be taken by Great Britain and France to demand that the Poles do something to help save the peace of Europe. The British Foreign Secretary had no desire to save European peace, but he was worried about the French attitude. He calculated that he could make a gesture toward cooperating with the French without running any great risk that the Poles would do something favorable.
He instructed Kennard to join Noël in requesting that the Poles notify the Germans of their willingness to accept direct negotiations. Kennard and Noël accordingly called on Beck in the early afternoon of August 31st and requested that Lipski be authorized to receive the German proposals officially and to relay them to Warsaw for consideration. Kennard was pleased to note that Beck replied evasively that he was not prepared to respond to this request.
Beck had actually dispatched instructions to Lipski shortly before noon to accept no proposals and to enter into no negotiations with the German Government. This telegram had been intercepted and immediately decoded by Göring’s special investigation office. Göring realized at once that the situation was hopeless unless something could be done to change the Polish attitude. He wished the British to know about the Beck telegram because he believed that they might respond by exerting pressure at Warsaw. Göring willingly gave away the fact that Germany possessed Poland’s diplomatic code when he showed the text of this Polish telegram to Dahlerus. The Swedish engineer was shocked by the intransigence of Beck, and he noted that the Germans in turn were extremely agitated by Beck’s communication to Lipski.
Hitler, despite his many worries about the future, could act with a clear conscience. He had offered to negotiate a moderate settlement with the Poles despite months of Polish provocations and savage persecution of the Germans in Poland. It was impossible to deny that he had turned the other cheek to Poland. The Polish refusal to discuss a settlement with Germany on any terms was insulting. The offer to negotiate was actually an offer for an armistice, because there had been no real peace between the two countries for many months.
Hitler did not desire war with Poland, but it was impossible for one nation to keep the peace by means of her own efforts alone. He issued the final attack order at forty minutes past noon, on August 31st. The operations could not conceivably be cancelled again later than 9:30 p.m. on the same day, because the beginning of operations was set for dawn on September 1st. Hitler introduced his order with the following statement: “Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.”
“It is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities (in the West) should rest unequivocally with England and France.”
Henderson continued to advise Halifax throughout the afternoon of August 31st that the German proposals to Poland were moderate, and that they offered an excellent basis for negotiation. The British Foreign Secretary was not impressed by the many appeals for peace which he was receiving from Paris, Rome, and Berlin. As a matter of fact, the British Foreign Office was becoming highly indignant at the tenacity with which the men on the continent, except in Poland, were struggling to preserve the peace.
It was the unfortunate experience of Dahlerus to encounter the full impact of this resentment.
He departed from the conference with Lipski at the Polish Embassy in a spirit of great indignation. It seemed to him incredible that the Poles should he allowed to sabotage a carefully prepared settlement after much good will had been displayed in other quarters.
He now believed that the British would reconsider their decision to support Poland if they were told the truth about the actual situation.
After all the British themselves had first suggested that Germany submit proposals to Poland.
They would surely desist from granting unconditional support to the Poles when they learned that the Polish Government was unwilling to consider the proposals.
Henderson encouraged Dahlerus to telephone London from the British Embassy in Berlin. The Swedish engineer contacted Sir Horace Wilson at the British Foreign Office at 12:30 p.m. on August 31st. He began to describe the situation in detail, and to complain about the Polish attitude. Wilson, like Chamberlain, had capitulated to the war policy of Halifax. He protested that he did not like the tone of Dahlerus’s remarks. He finally claimed that the Swedish engineer had no right to discuss the situation in this way, because the Germans might be listening on the line. This seemed a curious observation to Dahlerus. He saw no reason why the Germans should not hear his remarks, and the British had never before objected to telephone conversations with him over the Embassy line. Wilson began to shout repeatedly to the bewildered Swede: “Shut up!” Wilson concluded his report to Halifax on this incident with the following statement: “I again told Dahlerus to shut up. But as he did not do so I put down the receiver.”
The irritation of the British Foreign Office was no temporary mood, and the wrath of Halifax soon descended upon Henderson. The British Ambassador received several reprimands in very strong language for permitting Dahlerus to use the telephone. These reprimands were unjust, because Henderson had received instructions from London to extend the use of Embassy facilities to Dahlerus, and no instructions to the contrary had been received at the time of the unpleasant incident at 12:30 p.m. on August 31st.
Kennard reported at 3:20 p.m. that the Polish Government was taking steps to contact the German Government, but “will not agree to accept a document containing a demand until methods of procedure have been agreed to.” The Polish Government might as well have announced that it intended to contact the moon. The British and Poles had conspired to make a complete farce of the negotiation plan supported by
Germany, Italy, France, and Pope Pius XII.
Kennard had assured Beck privately after the Anglo-French démarche that the British Government did not
actually wish Lipski to receive the German proposals, and that the formal step at Warsaw had been a gesture of appeasement to France.
He asked Halifax if he should inform Beck “what we know” of the contents of the proposals, but he was obviously reluctant to do so.
Kennard was not aware that Beck had received the text of the German proposals from Lipski many hours earlier. His only fear was that there might be a last minute peaceful solution instead of the war which he and Halifax desired.
Ribbentrop received Lipski at 6:30 p.m. on August 31st. The Polish Ambassador read the contents of a note from Beck. The note stated [falsely] that Poland had just now received word about the recent talks between Great Britain and Germany which had started on August 23rd.
The attitude of the Polish Government toward eventual talks between Poland and Germany had not been decided, but it was favorable in principle, and the German Government was informed that the Polish Government would soon indicate to the British Government its attitude toward such talks. Beck was not prepared to give the Germans an assurance that Poland was actually willing to renew negotiations with Germany.
Ribbentrop listened sadly to the senseless double-talk of the Polish note, which Beck undoubtedly considered sufficiently clever and misleading to confuse the Germans.
Ribbentrop told Lipski that he had hoped until the last minute that he would be empowered to negotiate. Lipski explained that he had been instructed merely to call on Ribbentrop and to present the Polish note. He was not allowed to give any personal assurances, or to make any statements. It is not surprising under these circumstances that the interview was a short one. Ribbentrop concluded the interview by asking if Lipski personally believed that his Government might reconsider its decision and permit him to negotiate. The Polish diplomat evaded this question by repeating that he had not received plenary powers.”
German peace proposals read on radio broadcast:
“The German radio broadcast to the world at 9:00 p.m. on August 31st the Marienwerder proposals which Poland had refused to consider. Weizsäcker also presented the Marienwerder terms to the British, French, Japanese, American, and Russian diplomatic representatives at Berlin between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on August 31st. The terms were accompanied in each instance by a diplomatic note which explained recent German policy. The main emphasis was on the fact that Hitler had waited in vain for two days to receive an indication that Poland would negotiate with Germany, although the British on August 28th had assured him that Poland was prepared to negotiate.
The Polish radio broadcast a distorted version of the German offer two hours later. It offered the world a glimpse of the mentality which was being encountered by the helpless German minority in Poland. The Polish broadcaster argued that the Germans in their proposals had revealed their aggressive intentions, and he concluded with the following statement:
“Words can now no longer veil the aggressive plans of the new Huns. Germany is aiming at the domination of Europe and is canceling the rights of nations with as yet unprecedented cynicism. This impudent proposal shows clearly how necessary were the military orders (general mobilization) given by the Polish Government.”
The breakdown in relations was complete so far as Germany and Poland were concerned.
Hitler had failed in his effort to win Poland as a stalwart Slavic ally against Bolshevism, and this in itself was a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude.
German military operations commenced five hours later. Polish resistance began to crumble within a few days under the well-aimed German blows.
The local German-Polish war need not have disturbed the peace of Europe for more than a few weeks.
It would have been far easier for foreign Powers to intervene effectively to ameliorate the lot of the Poles, at least within the German area of occupation, had the war remained limited. The restoration of peace in Poland would have been an immediate concern, rather than some distant eventuality. Poland twenty years later is a Communist satellite of the Soviet Union. It would be impossible to imagine a result more distasteful to the Polish leaders who recklessly plunged Poland into a hopeless war against Germany in 1939. Their grandiose hopes and dreams of a new Great Poland remained unrealized, and their people were subjected to the worst possible fate.
Halifax did everything possible to encourage the desperate Polish challenge to Germany which resulted in the permanent domination of Poland by the Soviet Union.”
Other books include:
“Polish Atrocities Against The German Minority In Poland” Hans Schadewaldt (includes photos in zdoc)
” Hitler’s War” David Irving
“The Image of the Germans in Polish Literature” Else Loser
“President Roosevelt’s Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents” Mark Weber
“Back Door to War” G.C. Tansill
“What the World Rejected: Hitler’s Peace Offers” Friedrich Stieve
Although The Forced War provides the greatest detail on the events taking place in Europe, other books such as Back Door to War and President Roosevelt’s Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents reveal that the strongest influence came from President Roosevelt, who constantly pushed Britain and France with assurances America would support them 100%. Essentially the British guarantee to Poland, was the American guarantee to Poland.
Halifax tells Roosevelt on 1/24/39 that he has received:
“a large number of reports from various reliable sources which throw a most disquieting light on Hitler’s mood and intentions….
Hitler had recently planned to establish an independent Ukraine, and that he intended to destroy the Western Powers in a surprise attack before he moved into the East. Not only British intelligence but “highly placed Germans who are anxious to prevent this crime ‘had furnished evidence of this evil conspiracy…’
…Roosevelt was informed by Halifax that Hitler might seek to push Italy into war in the Mediterranean to find an excuse to fight. This was the strategy which Halifax himself hoped to adopt by pushing Poland into war with Germany. Halifax added that Hitler planned to invade Holland, and to offer the Dutch East Indies to Japan. He suggested to Roosevelt that Hitler would present an ultimatum to Great Britain, if he could not use Italy as a pawn to provoke a war. Halifax added casually that the British leaders expected a surprise German attack from the air before the ultimatum arrived. He assured Roosevelt that this surprise attack might occur at any time. He claimed that the Germans were mobilizing for this effort at the very moment he was preparing this report.
The British Foreign Secretary reckoned that Roosevelt might have some doubt about these provocative and mendacious claims. He hastened to top one falsehood with another by claiming that an “economic and financial crisis was facing Germany” which would compel the allegedly bankrupt Germans to adopt these desperate measures. He added with false modesty that some of this ‘may sound fanciful and even fantastic and His Majesty’s Government have no wish to be alarmist.'”
The same strategy is used on Poland by the Zionist British leaders:
“The British leaders made another futile attempt to persuade [Polish Foreign Minister Joseph] Beck to transform the Polish-Rumanian alliance from an anti-Soviet pact into an anti-German pact. Beck replied that he opposed this plan.
The British leaders did not like Beck’s response. They wished him to think exclusively in terms of destroying Germany, and to forget other considerations. In other words, they wished his thinking to be more similar to that of President Roosevelt in the United States. They began to employ the same propaganda methods on Beck which they used with Roosevelt. They began to suggest a number of hypothetical situations with their usual formula of saying “this may sound fantastic, but ‘what would you do in such and such a case.’ Beck put a stop to this by declaring bluntly that ‘it was against the tradition of the Polish Government to express definite opinions about third countries without directly consulting them.’
Beck did not like this English style of rumor-mongering. He was convinced that this assertion of alleged German designs against Hungary was entirely false. He wished that the British leaders would desist from their efforts to alarm him in this way. He assured the British leaders with studied emphasis that he was entirely convinced Germany was not planning any political action outside her present frontiers except at Danzig.
Halifax soon concluded that the tactics which were effective with President Roosevelt could produce no effect on Beck. This was true because Beck was much better informed about European affairs than President Roosevelt and his advisers.”
The British need to use care to start a war Germany doesnt want, while making it appear Germany is the cause of the war and at the same time dragging in France:
“…It was conceivable that Halifax could lead Great Britain into a war which began with a surprise Polish invasion of Germany, but the Polish leaders knew that France and the United States were also of decisive importance to British policy.
The Poles knew that Halifax would never support Poland unless he could drag France into war. This policy was dictated by the simple fact that Halifax did not believe Great Britain could win a war against Germany without the participation of France.
The Poles also knew that it would be difficult for President Roosevelt to arouse the American people against Germany unless it was possible to maintain that Poland was the innocent victim of German aggression… ”
Atrocities against Germans living in the Danzig corridor continue to increase throughout 1939:
“Polish provocation of Germany after March 31, 1939, was frequent and extreme, and Hitler soon had more than a sufficient justification to go to war with Poland on the basis of traditional practices among the nations. Nevertheless, Hitler could not justify German action, unless he believed that he was prepared to meet the consequences. He hoped to avoid war with Great Britain, and he knew that he would run a grave risk of an Anglo-German war if he invaded Poland. It was for this reason that German-Polish relations became progressively worse over a long period before they produced a conflict.
German Dr. Rudolf Wiesner…addressed an appeal to [Polish} Premier Slawoj-Skladkowski from Bielitz, East Upper Silesia, on May 25, 1939. He complained about the current wave of mass arrests of the members of his organization, and he submitted a long list of individuals who had been arrested for no apparent reason. He informed the Premier that he was asking for protection on the basis of the loyal attitude of his group.
The new wave of Polish excesses against the German minority in Poland, after the Beck speech, infuriated Germany without impressing the British leaders, who were aware of them, or the British public, which was uninformed.
The [German] Danzigers were convinced that Poland would show them no mercy if she were permitted to obtain the upper hand.
The Danzig Government presented two protest notes to the Poles on July 29, 1939, concerning illegal activities of Polish customs inspectors and frontier officials. The Danzig Government objected to hostile Polish economic measures and threatened to undertake reprisals. The Polish Government ignored this warning, and on August 1, 1939, it terminated the export of duty-free herring and margarine from Danzig to Poland, although the sale of these items to Poland constituted 10% of the total trade of the Free City.
It was pointed out that the number of Polish customs inspectors, before the recent increase, was 400% above the 1929 level, although the trade of Danzig remained much smaller in 1939 than it had been ten years earlier. The cost of the increased number of inspectors was carried exclusively by the impoverished Danzig community.
Senate President Greiser received official notification in the early hours of August 5, 1939, that the frontiers of Danzig would be closed to the importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig Government promised by 6:00 p.m. the same day, never to interfere with the activities of Polish customs inspectors. The threat was formidable, because Danzig produced a relatively small proportion of her own food. Greiser was informed that every Polish customs inspector would bear arms while performing his duty after August 5, 1939.
[Polish Commissioner] Marian Chodacki concluded many years later that the Polish ultimatum of August 4th (dated August 4th, presented August 5th) was a serious tactical mistake. It was not based on any specific incident or hostile act of the Danzig Government.”
Despite Polish abuses in Danzig, Hitler offers concessions to keep the peace:
“Hitler concluded that Poland was seeking to provoke an immediate conflict with Germany. He advised Greiser to capitulate at once… Greiser contacted Chodacki on the morning of August 5th to inform him that Danzig submitted to the Polish ultimatum. He reminded the Polish High Commissioner that no order for interference with the Polish customs inspectors had been issued by the Danzig Government.
He expressed astonishment that Chodacki had threatened to starve Danzig for no apparent reason, and he protested against the new Polish directive which provided for the total militarization of the Polish customs inspectors in Danzig….
Poland responds with hostility and threats, and ends negotiations for no reason:
“…The German Government was warned that Poland would consider further German intervention against Polish interests at Danzig an act of aggression. The Polish Government disclaimed responsibility for the consequences which would ensue if the German Government persisted in its efforts to protect Danzig….
The German Government was further informed that Polish willingness to discuss Danzig with Germany in the past had been a voluntary gesture of good will on the part of Poland, which the Polish Government was no longer willing to permit.”
Roosevelt, who fully intends to enter the war 2 years before doing so, is concerned that the American public will wise up to the grand deception and discover that Germany is not the aggressor:
“American Ambassador Bullitt at Paris informed President Roosevelt on August 3, 1939, that Beck was predicting that an intense and decisive phase of the crisis between Germany and Poland might occur before August 15, 1939. President Roosevelt knew that Poland was obviously to blame for the crisis which began at Danzig on August 4th, and he was alarmed at the prospect that the American public might learn the truth about the situation. This could be a decisive factor in discouraging his program for American military intervention in Europe.
He instructed Under-Secretary Sumner Welles on August 11, 1939, to order American Ambassador Biddle to advise the Poles about this problem. President Roosevelt urged the Poles to be more clever in making it appear that German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at Danzig.
The response of Beck to American intervention was not encouraging. Biddle reported to President Roosevelt, at midnight on August 11th, that the Polish Government had decided that there could be absolutely no concessions to Germany. Beck was obviously unwilling to engage in a series of elaborate but empty maneuvers which might have been useful in deceiving the American public. Beck wished the American President to know that he was content at the moment to have full British support for his policy.
It was apparent to the German Government that the British and French were either unable or unwilling to restrain the Polish Government from arbitrary steps which could produce an explosion.
The alternatives in this situation would be the abandonment of German aspirations at Danzig or war. “
Running out of options for peace, Germany requests help from the League of Nations:
[International governing body League of Nations] High Commissioner Jacob Burckhardt believed that Poland was utterly wrong in her claim that the Danzig Government had no right to restrict the activities of the Polish customs inspectors to specific areas based upon the existing agreements.
He had received detailed information from Germany on August 3, 1939, about Hitler’s instructions for an effort to end the friction with Poland at Danzig. Burckhardt discussed the question of the customs inspectors with [Polish Commissioner] Chodacki, but he admitted to [German leader at Danzig] Albert Forster that he had received a very unfriendly reception. He added that the Polish High Commissioner was not interested in the attempt of Hitler to exert a moderating influence on Danzig.
It proved impossible for the Polish state, which Pilsudski had created, to survive the consequences of the foreign policy pursued by Jozef Beck. The Polish state was heading for a war which was entirely unnecessary. Beck was deliberately gambling on the unlikely possibility that the inevitable defeat of Poland, in the early phase of the war, would be temporary because the Halifax war policy would provide for the destruction of both Germany and the Soviet Union….
He ignored the fact that Halifax and the other British leaders were coldly indifferent about the future of Poland, and that they would not fail to sacrifice Polish interests whenever it was considered expedient to do so. Poland was useful to Halifax in fomenting a war against Germany, but that was all….
This was solely because Halifax wanted war. The British Government under normal circumstances would have denounced the diplomacy of Beck in scathing terms. Beck would have received the warning that further steps of this kind meant the end of British obligations to Poland, had the British Government favored peace.
Poland had a unique and valuable mission to perform for Europe as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Her commitment to the war policy of Lord Halifax was the main obstacle to the successful performance of this mission in 1939.”
Russia’s is pleased to learn that the western powers while are fighting on behalf of communism, despite publicly pretending to oppose it:
“The Soviet leaders hoped for a conflict between Germany and the Western Powers which would exhaust the capitalist states and create conditions favorable for the expansion of Bolshevism.
The Soviet leaders had feared that Great Britain, France, and the United States would frustrate this hope by doing everything possible to promote an isolated war between Germany and the Soviet Union. (This would have seemed the logical policy from the standpoint of nations allegedly opposed to both Communism and Fascism.)
The Soviet leaders were delighted by the apparent determination of Halifax, after March 1939, to foment an Anglo-German War with or without the participation of the Soviet Union. This was the greatest contribution he could possibly make to the realization of Communist goals.”
Germany continues to appeal to the League of Nations to stop the abuses of Germans by the Polish; Britain’s only concern is decieving the outside world into beleiving Germany is the aggressor:
“Hitler told [League of Nations High Commissioner ]Jacob Burckhardt that further patience with the Poles was becoming an impossibility, and that grave danger existed of a German-Polish war. He predicted that Germany would defeat Poland in about three weeks if war came. He requested Burckhardt to inform the French and British of this situation, and to remind them that Germany did not desire a conflict with the Western Powers under any circumstances. Burckhardt agreed to undertake this mission.
Jozef Beck was nervous about this meeting, because he feared that Burckhardt would make a formidable effort to persuade the British and French not to attack Germany. He told [Polish diplomat] Szembek that he was furious with Burckhardt for accepting an interview with Hitler at this juncture.
Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary…received some plain language from Burckhardt about the atrocious mistreatment of the German minority by the Poles.
Halifax responded …that the Poles would have to improve their tactics if they hoped to avoid giving any impression that they were guilty of provoking the approaching war. Halifax also advised the Poles to cease their provocations at Danzig and to restrain their press. The Polish Foreign Minister was relieved to note that the Burckhardt mission had failed to modify British policy.”
Italy recommends an international conference to find a peaceful solution, and offers its support to Germany:
“[Italian Foreign Minister ]Galeazzo Ciano and Ribbentrop met with Hitler on the Obersalzberg in the afternoon for an intensive conference of more than three hours. Ciano insisted that a war with Poland should be avoided at any price, and he suggested that the Axis should issue an appeal for an international conference…
Hitler inquired what Ciano would do if Trieste were in Yugoslav hands, and if a large Italian minority were subjected to persecution on Yugoslav soil.
The German Chancellor thought that the danger of a general war in such a situation might discourage decisive action, but he added that it was his definite conviction that Great Britain and France, whatever their threats now, would not precipitate a general war.
Ciano argued that Great Britain and France would attack Germany despite a Russo-German agreement. He claimed that a war at this moment would be highly advantageous for the Western Powers.
He predicted that a war in 1939 would deal a catastrophic blow to German and Italian relations with the United States, because it would enable [the communist] President Roosevelt to obtain a third presidential term of office.
Ciano predicted that Roosevelt would lose his political game of exploiting foreign crises to advance his position at home if war could be averted at least until after the American presidential election in November 1940. Ciano was convinced that the temporary unity of opinion in Great Britain and France would gradually disintegrate if there were no war….Ciano promised Hitler that Italy would maintain a common front with Germany.
The American ambassador, who is unaware of Roosevelt and the Zionists’ plans for war at any cost, searches for peaceful solutions and is surprised to find Britain and Poland uninterested in them:
“American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy at London…suggested that it would be logical to respond to the [German pact with] Russia by seeking a peaceful settlement with Germany, but Halifax replied stiffly that “my reason shows me no way out but war.” This was because Halifax favored war with Germany at any price, and it was evident to Kennedy that he was impervious to reasonable proposals for peaceful negotiations….
Kennedy personally hoped that Poland would finally agree to resume negotiations with Germany, and he was disappointed to discover that neither Halifax nor Chamberlain was prepared to urge the Poles to adopt this course. He was convinced that Warsaw rather than Berlin constituted the chief menace to peace. He suggested to the American State Department that if President Roosevelt “is contemplating any action for peace, it seems to me the place to work is on Beck in Poland and to make this effective it must happen quickly. I see no other possibility.”
A Zionist American reporter fabricates cartoonish propaganda portraying composed and rational German leaders as rabid for war; The British ambassador stationed in Germany says Hitler wants war less than anyone in Germany.
“Hitler received the German military leaders at the Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939. He discussed the situation with them in morning and afternoon conferences…
One version of these conferences was presented by Louis P. Lochner of the American Associated Press to British diplomats at Berlin on August 25, 1939. This material was later cited by a number of historians as a valid record of the conferences, and it consciously or unconsciously influenced the thinking of British diplomats at the time. Otherwise, it would have been dismissed as something too ridiculous to receive serious consideration. The crass propaganda in the material would have been immediately discarded had people been permitted to think normally about important issues. Unfortunately, a furious and uninterrupted war propaganda campaign had been carried on in the West for more than five months, and nearly everyone, regardless of his mental caliber, had been seriously affected.
Why would anyone believe that Marshal Göring danced on the table and shrieked like a savage before a group of austere German Generals? Why would Hitler blandly announce to his Generals that “Göring had demonstrated to us that his Four-Year Plan is a failure and that we are at the end of our strength, if we do not achieve victory in a coming war?” This sounded more like a leaf from the book of President Roosevelt, who, unlike Hitler, was still facing a catastrophic depression. The statement would be sheer nonsense when applied to war with poverty-stricken Poland. Every informed person, including Lord Halifax, knew that Göring was the last person in Germany who would deliver arguments in favor of a general war at this time.
The memorandum stated that Hitler told his Generals he planned to kill the Polish women and children. This would have been proper material for an American “comic book,” and also for Hitler, if his purpose had been to goad his Generals into an immediate revolt against the German regime.
Succinct and reliable references to the meetings of August 22, 1939, are available from the actual participants. The traditions of popular journalism cannot excuse people, from any country, who seek to precipitate wars by spreading lies when feeling is running high.”
“[British ambassador ] Nevile Henderson was particularly irritated by repeated claims in the British press that Hitler had been intimidated by the firm support other Powers were giving to the Poles. He predicted that ‘history will judge the Press generally to have been the principal cause of the war.’
The press, with its vile and irresponsible tactics during this period, was undoubtedly an important factor, but Henderson failed to note that the worst phase of the press campaign in Great Britain followed inevitably from the distorted and dishonest official British version of the events at Prague in March 1939, and from the fantastic Tilea hoax, which had been deliberately perpetrated by Halifax and Vansittart to arouse the British public.
The British Ambassador was confusing cause and effect when he assigned the principal blame for the current crisis to the Western press.
Henderson pointed out that an Anglo-German agreement was necessary for German security, and he reminded Halifax that he was quite convinced Hitler sincerely desired such an agreement.
It seemed obvious to Henderson that a few resolute steps by Halifax could produce a satisfactory settlement, because ‘of all Germans, believe it or not, Hitler is the most moderate so far as Danzig and the Corridor are concerned.’
He charged that the British Embassy in Warsaw deliberately refused to recognize the actual desperate situation of the German minority in Poland.
He observed with keen insight that ‘Warsaw with its civilized and intelligent, not to say astute clique with which one consorts there, is one thing. Outside in the country the Poles are an utterly uncivilized lot.’
Halifax responded by informing Henderson that British determination to support Poland could not be influenced by Hitler’s diplomacy. He reiterated his favorite theme that he was doing everything to avoid war simply by making the British position clear.”
Hitler writes an appeal to the Prime Minister of Britain as Polish atrocities against Germans mount:
“The German Foreign Office took stock of its huge file of specific reports of excesses against national and ethnic Germans in Poland. More than ten detailed reports were arriving each day, and more than 1,500 documented reports had been received since March 1939. They presented a staggering picture of brutality and human misery.
The Polish Government on August 25th dealt with a German protest that three German civilian airplanes carrying passengers and flying over the Baltic Sea had been fired upon by Polish batteries on the Hela peninsula. The Poles admitted firing on only one German airplane on August 24th, and they claimed that it had been sighted flying over Polish territory prior to the Polish attack.
Hitler’s letter to Chamberlain on August 23, 1939, placed principal emphasis on the intensity of suffering among the Germans of Poland…
He also accused [Britain] of encouraging war between Poland and Germany by presenting the Poles with a blank check for British support in any conflict, regardless of its origin…
Great Britain had encouraged Polish intransigence by stating that she would support Poland in any conflict against Germany. Hitler concluded that this situation would destroy his life-long ambition to promote Anglo-German friendship and understanding.
Mussolini recognized that Hitler had a mystical faith that wisdom would prompt the British leaders to avoid the tragedy of a new Anglo-German conflict. Mussolini wished it to be clearly understood in Germany that he did not share this faith despite the recent success of German policy in Russia.”
A British politician, unaware of Zionist British commitment to war at any cost, assumes war can be easily prevented. Also unware that the map of Europe was redrawn to intentionally create conflicts after WW1, he heads to Germany to explore options for peace, with the idea that lands cans simply be restored to the countries they were taken from.
“Charles Roden Buxton, the Labour Party foreign policy expert and Quaker leader, arrived at Berlin on a visit on August 15, 1939…
Buxton announced that he was in Berlin to discuss an amicable settlement of Anglo-German friction.
The personal plan which Buxton presented contained everything which Hitler desired and much more than he would have requested in a settlement with Halifax. It began with the crucial point that the British Empire should disinterest itself in Eastern Europe after recognizing that the German Reich had special interests in that area.
Buxton advocated the return of the German colonies held by Great Britain and France, and the convening of an international colonial conference on the basis of the Berlin conference of 1885 for a rational redistribution of colonial territory among the leading colonial Powers. This did not mean that any particular Power would necessarily receive a net increase of colonial territory, but it was hoped that an exchange of territories in specific areas would reduce future points of friction. Buxton also advocated the liquidation of British economic imperialism in Eastern Europe, for instance in Rumania, where Great Britain exerted pressure on the local authorities for unfair concessions at the expense of normal trade.
He believed that it would be necessary for Great Britain to disavow her guarantees to Poland, Rumania, and Greece as the only means of terminating unwarranted British intervention in Eastern Europe. Buxton believed that the British Government should atone for their harmful influence in Poland by offering to mediate in the dispute between Poland and Germany. He advocated a program of mutual confidence which would include a new Anglo-German naval treaty, the reduction of armaments, and mutual inspection of the national military establishments in Great Britain and Germany.
It was obvious to the German diplomats that Buxton was presenting a very real and vital plan for the settlement of Anglo-German tension, and there were no German objections whatever to the points which he proposed. It was equally clear that the British Government would have accepted this program were Butler rather than Halifax responsible for the conduct of British foreign policy. The Buxton plan would have afforded a marvelous platform for a negotiated settlement had it been presented officially by the British Government. Hitler was aware that Buxton intended him to use these proposals in negotiations with the British Government, and he did not hesitate to do so after the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact.”
The behavior of British Parliament at this stage just before the outbreak of war, demonstrates:
(1) how little support there is for war among Britian’s elected leaders
(2) an alarming level of confusion in Parliament about the very basics of what was going on, even in the final days before a major war.
It was not the elected British Parliament who wanted war. It was a few carefully placed Zionists.
“The various Parliamentary factions displayed considerable confusion on August 24th. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, suggested that a possible attack against the British Empire should be the primary consideration of Chamberlain rather than the defense of Poland.
The Communist member, Gallacher, continued to insist that Great Britain should do nothing without a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.
The statement of Ernest Bevin, who spoke for the British Labour Party, was particularly interesting.
Bevin insisted that a British guarantee of Poland without support from the Soviet Union was a much too formidable undertaking. He suggested that the time had arrived for a solution of the Polish crisis by further negotiation.
The various factions are all confused about why peace can’t be negotiated in situation this simple.
…The policy of Halifax was calculated to destroy Germany rather than to permit that normal growth and development which for centuries had been considered the natural right of every nation. It was a policy which led to the destruction of a friendly Germany and to the domination of Europe by a hostile Union pledged to overthrow the capitalist system in Great Britain.”
In the final days leading up to war, the Swedish diplomat Dalherus attempts to show the British leaders how committed Germany is to peace.
“Birger Dahlerus submitted a careful memorandum at the British Foreign Office on August 25th about Göring’s remarks on the previous day.
Hitler wished for a peaceful settlement which would not sacrifice the national dignity of Germany recently regained after so great an effort. Göring had one main point to offer. If the British would reconcile themselves to a strong Germany on the European continent, Germany, in return, would aid, rather than oppose, the British Empire. Above all, Göring believed it was important that neither Power should intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbor.
Göring was convinced that two commercial spheres of respective economic concentration could be defined by the two trading nations.
Dahlerus insisted warmly that it was evident to him from his intimate knowledge of Germany ‘that the German nation as such certainly does not want a war, but desire to build up their own country and endeavour to establish a higher standard of living for the whole nation.’
Dahlerus concluded his first meeting with the British diplomats by reminding them of Göring’s promise that Hitler would come very far to meet any offer from Great Britain.”
Hitler meets with the British Ambassador to Germany, where he points out the absurdity of the fictional press stories about Germany’s desire for world conquest, and makes yet another peace offer, this time an offer to Britain of the full support and friendship of Germany. He offers to sign a guarantee that Germany will not pursue any actions to change the balance of power in Europe.
“Hitler had earlier requested British Ambassador Henderson to call at 1:30 p.m. to receive formal German proposals for an Anglo-German agreement. He received Henderson on schedule and informed him that the Danzig question would be settled, and that his pact with Russia precluded the danger of a Russo-German war. He reminded Henderson that he had no aspirations in Western Europe, and that he wished the British Empire to remain prosperous and strong. He added that the colonial problem could be relegated to the far-distant future, and he asserted that it would be unwise in any event to discuss such problems until Great Britain and Germany had reached an agreement for the reduction of armaments.
The German leader reminded the British Ambassador that his purpose in arranging the meeting was to present a formal offer for an Anglo-German agreement. Germany wished to follow up her treaty with Russia by concluding a treaty of friendship with Great Britain
He denied the charges of the British leaders that Germany entertained plans of world conquest. Hitler reminded Henderson that the integral parts of the British Empire comprised 40 million square kilometers of land. Germany occupied a modest area of less than 600,000 square kilometers. Many nations occupied formidable places between the top British position on the list of large Powers, and the German position farther down the list. For instance, the Soviet Union contained 19 million square kilometers, and the United States of America 9 million square kilometers. Hitler refused to concede that any German plans to conquer the world could be feasible.
Hitler told Henderson that this did not change the fact that Germany faced an acute problem in her own immediate neighborhood. He was determined to regulate conditions in a part of the area lost by Germany twenty years earlier, and this meant Danzig and the Corridor. The only possible result Hitler could see from the Prime Minister’s speech of the previous day was a bloody and incalculable war. He was prepared to take every possible step to avert this catastrophe, and he was now presenting terms for the comprehensive agreement with Great Britain which he had always desired. His offer was predicated on the assumption that Great Britain would be willing to recognize German obligations to Italy just as Germany accepted British obligations to France.
He was prepared to proceed along the lines of the Buxton plan, and to assume the greatest and most complex commitment on behalf of Great Britain that had ever been offered by any foreign political leader. This commitment was no less than his willingness to place the entire power of the Reich at the disposal of the British for the defense of the British Empire at any point and any time. The British leaders themselves, of course, would be free to decide in any threatening situation when and if they needed this aid. Hitler believed that an arrangement of Anglo-German differences would create conditions of complete security for both Powers, and it was obvious that a drastic reduction of armaments would be immediately feasible. He was willing to sign a guarantee at once that Germany desired no change in the status quo throughout Western Europe. Hitler added delicately that, if his proposals failed and war ensued, Great Britain would not emerge as a stronger Power, whatever the outcome. He declared that the vital interests of Germany required him to make his entire offer conditional on a settlement of the German-Polish dispute along lines acceptable to Germany.
Henderson desired an Anglo-German agreement, and he was deeply moved by his meeting with Hitler on August 25, 1939. The British Ambassador offered a number of personal observations when he relayed Hitler’s remarkable offer to Halifax and Chamberlain.
Henderson warmly recommended to Halifax that Hitler should be given an opportunity to demonstrate his good intentions.
The Anglo-Polish alliance treaty of August 25, 1939, contained a secret protocol which provided that the treaty would be applied exclusively against Germany. The London Times carried a story on the morning of August 25th from their Berlin correspondent to the effect that a German-Polish war would inevitably produce the annexation of extensive Polish territories by the Soviet Union. The first official revelation that the British Government was not obliged to defend Poland against the Soviet Union was made by Rab Butler in the House of Commons on October 19, 1939, more than one month after the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union. By that time the British were fully embarked on their campaign against Germany inspired by their alleged desire to defend the territorial integrity of Poland. The British merely agreed to consult with the Poles in the event of aggression against Poland by the Soviet Union.
(Despite all the lies and rewritten history about the causes of World War 2, who was responsible and why, this point exposes the truth to all who are interested.
Britain only pretended to support Poland under the flimsy pretext of preventing innocent Poles being attacked. When in fact the only purpose of the alliance with Poland was to embolden the Polish to escalate atrocities against Germans and create the conditions for a large conflict. As soon as they got their war on Germany kicked off, instantly the “innocent” Poles didn’t matter and Russia was permitted to annex eastern Poland.)”
More atrocities from Poland, more offers from Germany to negotiate:
“The news of the Anglo-Polish Pact persuaded Hitler that the British might attack Germany despite the German treaty with Russia. He was faced with a terrible dilemma. If he retreated, the Germans of the East, including Danzig, would be abandoned to the cruelty and arrogance of a hostile Poland. If he took effective action against the Poles, the British might unleash another general European War.
Halifax received two urgent appeals from Henderson shortly before the Polish treaty was signed. The British Ambassador stated frankly in his first message that he favored the acceptance of Hitler’s offer for an agreement. He urged Halifax to give the German proposals serious consideration. The second message reported a major atrocity against the Germans in Poland which had taken place on the same day. Henderson never relied on official German information concerning these incidents, and he was basing his report on confirmation which he had received from neutral sources. The latest atrocity had taken place at Bielitz, East Upper Silesia. The Poles were forcibly deporting the Germans of that area, and compelling them to march into the interior. Eight Germans were murdered and many more were injured during one of these actions on August 25, 1939. Henderson feared that the Bielitz atrocity would be the final straw to prompt Hitler to invade Poland. He made no secret of the fact that he deplored the failure of the British Government to exercise restraint over the Polish authorities.
Hitler had invited French Ambassador Robert Coulondre to call on him at 5:30 p.m. on August 25th. Hitler met the French Ambassador on schedule and described the latest incidents against the Germans in Poland.
Hitler assured Coulondre that he wished to avoid war with France. Nevertheless, he exclaimed: “I will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it through to the bitter end.
Hitler requested Coulondre to convey these sentiments to French Premier Daladier.
Coulondre also gave Hitler his word of honor that France would now do everything within her power to compel the Poles to moderate their policies. Hitler replied: “I believe you; I even believe that men like M. Beck are moderate, but they are no longer in control of the situation.”
The new German offer to Poland on August 29, 1939, was the most important development during the several days after Hitler’s decision of August 25, 1939, for a last diplomatic campaign to settle the German-Polish dispute. The terms of a new German plan for a settlement, the so-called Marienwerder proposals, were not disclosed to the Poles until August 31, 1939, and they were less important than the offer to negotiate as such. The terms of the Marienwerder proposals were essentially nothing more than a tentative German plan for a possible settlement.
The Germans, in offering to negotiate with Poland, were announcing to the world that they favored a diplomatic settlement over war with Poland. The Poles, in refusing to negotiate, were announcing that they favored war. The refusal of Halifax to encourage the Poles to negotiate indicated that the British Foreign Secretary also favored war. He chose to ignore Hitler’s offer to accept the British guarantee of Poland once the Danzig dispute was settled by negotiation. The important thing would have been for the Poles to resume negotiations, and to permit the opening of the door which Beck had closed without any adequate reason in his speech of May 5, 1939. The willingness of the Poles to negotiate would not have implied their readiness to recognize the German annexation of Danzig, nor would it in any way have implied a Polish retreat. The Poles could have motivated their acceptance with the announcement that Germany, and not Poland, had found it necessary to request new negotiations.
Beck undoubtedly would have adopted a different attitude toward the situation had Halifax insisted that he agree to compromise with Germany. The greatest worry at the Polish Foreign Office for several days after August 25, 1939, was that the British would change their minds about attacking Germany, and decide at the last moment not to honor their obligations to Poland. It was natural for Beck to conclude under these circumstances that it would be wise to provoke a conflict with Germany as soon as possible, and before the British leaders changed their minds.”
The buffoon Roosevelt suggests fomenting a revolution inside Germany, and promises to deceive the American public into the war when the time comes:
“President Roosevelt designed to facilitate a closer coordination of British and American policy against Germany. The American President suggested that everything possible should be done by propaganda to bring down the German regime in revolutionary chaos. Roosevelt believed that wireless propaganda should be broadcast to Germany around the clock. He expected that it would produce a great effect to argue in advance that Hitler would be solely responsible for any war. He hoped that the pacific desires of the German people might be exploited to undermine the loyalty of Germans toward their Government after the outbreak of war.
Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, addressed a series of final reports to Halifax:
The American President had damaged his prospects in May 1939 with his unsuccessful attempt to pull the teeth from the American neutrality laws, but he assured Lindsay that he would succeed in emasculating this legislation after the outbreak of war. He admitted that he would be forced to delay a new effort to do so “until war broke out.” The American President also promised that he would not actually abide by the neutrality laws if he was compelled to invoke them.
The British Ambassador was personally perturbed that the President of one of the important countries could be gay and joyful about a tragedy which seemed so destructive of the hopes of all mankind. He reported that Roosevelt spoke in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank. It was an American and world tragedy to have at this important juncture a President whose emotions and ideas could be rated by a friendly Ambassador as childish.
Halifax was inclined to regard the attitude of the American President as a product of one of the most successful British efforts in colonial propaganda.
The American President, who was an enthusiastic militarist, had accepted the idea of World War II as his best escape from the hopelessly unsuccessful policies with which he had failed to cope with the economic depression in the United States.”
France doesn’t want war either:
“Coulondre made a vigorous appeal for peace after Hitler had read the letter from Daladier. The French Ambassador insisted that a war fought with modern arms would above all be a great tragedy for the women and children of Europe. Coulondre noted that these carefully calculated words produced a great effect on Hitler. There was a long pause, after which the German Chancellor observed pensively: “Yes, I have often thought of the women and children.”
Hitler wrote a careful reply to Daladier, which Ribbentrop personally delivered to the French Ambassador on the following day. The French Ambassador was filled with new hope that there would be no war after his conversation with Hitler on August 26th.
The German Chancellor reminded Daladier that he was not seeking a quarrel with France, and that he had gladly renounced Alsace-Lorraine. He asked Daladier what his feelings would be if Marseilles, a French port city more than twice the size of Danzig, were converted to a Free City, and were forced to accept constant lawless acts and usurpations from a smaller neighboring Power.
Hitler requested Ribbentrop to extend a pledge to Coulondre, in response to the remark about the European women and children made by the French-diplomat the previous day. Hitler promised not to take the initiative, in the event of hostilities, in the waging of war against enemy civilians. This pledge was later strictly observed. It was rendered inoperative by the indiscriminate British bombing campaign over Germany which had been planned as early as 1936.
German Chargé d’Affaires Thomsen reminded Hitler on August 28th that Roosevelt would do everything he could to encompass the downfall of Germany. He predicted that Roosevelt would employ ruthless tactics to force active American participation in a European war despite opposition from American public opinion. Thomsen was convinced that American raw materials and machines would be made available to Great Britain and France immediately after the outbreak of war, and that this measure would be popular because it would aid in overcoming the extensive unemployment. Thomsen concluded that the existing American neutrality legislation would be either abrogated or circumvented.”
Swedish diplomat urges Britain to reconsider Hitler’s peace offers and concessions:
Birger Dahlerus, who was conducting an unofficial mission for Germany, had conferred in London with Halifax on August 25th and 26th…
“Halifax was unable to deny that Hitler’s response to Chamberlain’s letter of August 23, 1939, had reopened the official channels of negotiation
Dahlerus at last succeeded in contacting Marshal Göring at 8:00 p.m
Göring emphasized that the situation was extremely serious, and that an Anglo-German conference was very much to be desired. He added that it would be an asset of incalculable importance if the British decided to return a favorable response to the agreement offer which Hitler had given to Henderson that same afternoon.
Dahlerus informed Halifax of his conversation with Göring on the telephone the previous evening. Halifax presented Dahlerus with a personal letter to Göring, which recommended direct German negotiations with the Poles.
The British leaders assured Dahlerus on August 27th that a formal reply to Hitler’s offer would soon be made, and that, in the meantime, they were willing to convey informally the substance of their response.
The German Chancellor was extremely pleased with the results of the Dahlerus visit to London on August 27th. His most pressing question at this point was whether or not Halifax was willing to consider an eventual Anglo- German alliance. Hitler assured Dahlerus that he would be willing to accept the British commitment to Poland once Germany had settled her own differences with the Poles. He believed that the British would recognize that he had made an important concession when he ceased to regard their guarantee to Poland as an obstacle to an Anglo- German understanding. Hitler then raised the crucial point. He insisted that it was necessary for the British to persuade the Poles to negotiate with Germany. Otherwise nothing would be accomplished, war would be inevitable, and a favorable opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding would be lost.”
(The only reason the weak and overmatched Poles refuse to negotiate, and refuse to stop persecuting the Germans in Danzig, is the British guarantee of support.)
“Dahlerus immediately contacted the British diplomats in Berlin to inform them that he strongly endorsed Hitler’s response to Halifax’s suggestions.
Dahlerus also informed the British diplomats that Hitler was prepared to accept an international guarantee of Poland as part of any settlement. The Swedish engineer confided that Hitler was much impressed with what he regarded as British sincerity in seeking to compose Anglo-German differences.
Dahlerus noted in a special report to the British that Göring had made a very realistic suggestion on August 26th. The German Marshal insisted that Germany wanted only the facts from both Dahlerus and the British, and that no concern should be given to avoid the wounding of German feelings. Göring believed that this frankness was necessary if the serious obstacles to an Anglo-German understanding were to be cleared away successfully. Dahlerus assured Halifax that personal contact with Hitler had convinced him that the German Chancellor did not desire war.
Dahlerus believed that he had done everything possible to prompt the British to make constructive suggestions in their reply to Hitler. There was nothing further to do but wait for the test of the official British note.
The reply which Henderson carried to Germany was a most interesting document.
Halifax wished Hitler to know that the Polish Government had declared its willingness to negotiate directly with the German Government. It is surely an understatement to observe at this point that Halifax had displayed surprisingly small concern about verifying an allegedly sincere Polish declaration of such obvious importance. No doubt Halifax would have shown more care and energy in this matter had he actually desired a negotiated settlement of German-Polish differences.
Halifax would have ceased working for war and would have joined the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy in the search for peace had he believed his own words. This development alone would have been quite sufficient to save the entire situation.
The meeting between Hitler and Henderson on the night of August 28/29 took place in a very friendly atmosphere.
Hitler began to discuss the new proposals he was planning to offer Poland, and he knew that the British leaders had previously received considerable information about them from Dahlerus. Hitler admitted that he was sorely tempted to request revisions of the confusing Upper Silesian border, which ran through kitchens, bathrooms, barnyards and mines. Polish rule in Upper Silesia had been exceptionally harsh, and the Allied and Associated Powers had been particularly dishonest about their choice of methods to transfer this territory to Poland in the first place. Hitler said that he would not tempt fate by raising this issue, because he knew that any change in the status quo of the area now would seriously affect vital Polish economic interests.
Henderson hoped to encourage Hitler by recalling the traditional Anglo-German amity of the good old days. He cited a familiar schoolbook quotation from Prussian General Blücher to his troops on the eve of the battle of Waterloo in 1815: “Forward, my children, I have given my word to my brother Wellington, and you cannot wish me to break it.” Hitler, with a combined feeling of amusement and sadness, remarked that “things were different 125 years ago.” Henderson replied stoutly: “Not so far as England was concerned.” The German Chancellor refrained from further comment, and, after all, Henderson was right. The British (Zionists) were pursuing the same archaic balance of power theory in 1939 that had prompted their unrelenting wars against France from 1793 until the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815. It was merely an incidental feature that now Germany, and not France, suffered from the single-minded hostility of Great Britain (Zionism). This was merely because Germany, in the course of an evolution determined primarily by natural causes, had replaced France as the, leading Power in the European continental region west of Russia. This was the main reason for the change.
There was a brief interlude of very great optimism in Hitler’s immediate circle following the conversation with Henderson on the night of August 28/29 and the reception of the British note of August 28th. This optimism seemed fully justified by the unequivocal but utterly false British assurance that the Poles had been induced to agree to renewed direct negotiations.
It may be argued that Hitler and his entourage were extremely naive to believe any assurance which came from London. This was undoubtedly true, but it was simply not apparent to Hitler that the British had anything to gain by misrepresenting the Polish position.
Hitler, in his enthusiasm for the British Empire, was inclined to give the British leaders more credit for intelligence and integrity than they actually deserved.
Dahlerus had telephoned the British Foreign Office from Berlin at 7:00 a.m. on August 29th to inform Halifax that Hitler was optimistic about a peaceful settlement. Halifax received an angry warning from Beck shortly afterward that the Polish Government was contemplating new measures against Danzig. Beck complained that the Danzigers were displaying increasing reluctance to expedite the normal shipments of Polish goods from the Free City harbor into Poland. He was completely unaware that Halifax had assured Hitler that Poland was prepared to negotiate for a definitive settlement of the Danzig issue with Germany.
Henderson wired additional information to Halifax shortly after noon on August 29th about Germany’s forthcoming reply to Great Britain, and about her new proposals to the Poles. The British Ambassador announced that Hitler had decided not to raise the dangerous Upper Silesian question, and that he would restrict his proposals to Danzig and the Corridor region. Henderson added that Göring was anxious to receive some indication about the attitude of the Poles toward new negotiations. The Germans had decided to request the British Government to serve as intermediary in approaching the Poles.
Henderson warned London that Göring feared the Poles would be stubborn and “try to ruin Germany by being so obstructive that war would be inevitable.” Henderson emphasized again that Hitler was prepared to participate immediately in an international guarantee of any satisfactory results achieved in a new Polish-German negotiation.
Henderson was more anxious about the situation than Göring, because he had received no indication that the British Government had actually advised the Poles to negotiate. He knew that a terrible fiasco would result if Halifax failed to take steps at Warsaw.
He emphasized to the British Foreign Secretary that Hitler preferred a negotiated settlement to any war, including a local war. Above all, Hitler had admired the Poles too long to desire their destruction.”
Poland mobilizes troops amid German peace offers and efforts to negotiate:
“Within minutes of Henderson’s latest appeals on the 29th, which were ignored by Halifax, a telegraph arrived at London from Kennard. He wished to inform Halifax that the Polish Government had decided upon general mobilization. The Polish military plans stipulated that general mobilization would be ordered only in the event of a Polish decision for war. Halifax was primarily to blame for this rash Polish decision which made a German-Polish war virtually inevitable. He had failed to inform the Poles of Germany’s peaceful intentions…
It was difficult to criticize the Poles for reacting as they did to Halifax’s one-sided version of Göring’s disclosures.
Historians of all nations had attributed great importance to the sequence in which the various nations had mobilized at the outbreak of World War I. The fact that the Russians and the French had declared general mobilization before the Germans in 1914 was rightly considered a matter of very great importance. Halifax should have been able to foresee the inevitable consequences of his deceitful policy at Warsaw, yet he was irritated by the Polish decision. He knew that Germany would defeat Poland in a war, and he knew that the calling up of another half-dozen Polish divisions could not avert the debacle. The Poles would merely incur greater responsibility for starting war without preventing the ruin which would inevitably befall them in the event of war. Halifax had decided, with cool and deliberate calculation, to exert pressure on the Poles to delay their mobilization.”
Poland won’t discuss peace terms:
“Beck had received vague rumors that Poland might seriously be requested to resume negotiations with Germany, and he decided to head off any such step by disclosing in advance that the Poles would refuse to do so. Beck declared flatly to Kennard that he was unprepared to grant any concessions to the Germans, and therefore he saw no point in negotiations. He explained that he would not accept any part of the proposals which he had rejected earlier in March 1939. Halifax received this statement with evident satisfaction, and he deliberately neglected to address any further communications to Warsaw for a lengthy period. He knew that Kennard would stoutly support Beck’s fanatical intransigence.
These facts were unknown at Paris, Berlin, and Rome, where an atmosphere of increasing optimism prevailed. Halifax was also optimistic, but for the opposite reasons. The French, German, and Italian leaders hoped for peace. Halifax was reasonably certain that there would be war.
He had worked for war unceasingly during the past ten months, and he sensed that his triumph was close at hand. He failed to realize that his success would produce the eclipse of his own country. He ignored still another urgent telegram from Henderson that it would be in the vital interest of Poland to accept promptly a German invitation to negotiate. Halifax knew that the Poles would be doomed in the event of war, but he cared nothing for the fate of Poland.
Hitler by this time had approved the finishing touches on the German reply to Great Britain…He confirmed his desire for a peaceful settlement and his willingness to negotiate with the Poles. Hitler wished the British Government to advise Poland to send an emissary to Berlin on the following day, Wednesday, August 30th.
Dahlerus telephoned the British Foreign Office from Berlin a few minutes after Henderson had been received by Hitler. He wished Halifax to know that Hitler and Göring were very pleased by the British attitude toward Germany revealed in the British note of August 28, 1939. Dahlerus assured the British that the German reply would reach London the same evening. It was noted at London that the Swedish engineer was “very cheerful and exuberant.” He obviously believed that his labors were nearing a successful conclusion.
Halifax received a further communication from Kennard a few minutes after the call from Dahlerus. The British Ambassador confirmed the Polish decision to post general mobilization notices the following morning, and added that he had received the tart reminder that such notices could not be kept secret. Kennard had approved the Polish measure, despite the fact that Bonnet had instructed French Ambassador Noël to protest vigorously against general mobilization. Kennard minced no words in defending the Poles against possible criticism from Halifax.
Beck requested Kennard to inform Halifax that there was only one development which could prevent the Polish general mobilization scheduled for 8:00 o’clock, on the following morning. This would be an explicit statement from Hitler that Germany had abandoned Danzig once and for all, and that she would never again seek to improve her transit communications to East Prussia through the Polish Corridor. Beck announced that he was prepared to receive and study the full text of Hitler’s reply to Great Britain at any hour. Poland would proceed with her military measures unless Hitler retreated. Beck had previously made it perfectly clear that he would not negotiate with Germany.
Hitler engaged in a lengthy discussion with Henderson about the German note to Great Britain of August 29th.
Henderson departed from his conference with Hitler with the conviction that it would be possible to prevent a war between Germany and Poland. He contacted London at once, and he warmly recommended that the British Government make every effort to persuade the Poles to accept the German offer to negotiate on the exact terms laid down by Hitler. The British Foreign Office received the summary text of Hitler’s reply at 9:15 p.m. on August 29th. There was ample time for the British Government to contact Warsaw, and for the Poles to send an emissary to Berlin at any time on the following day.
A decisive warning from the British that he definitely would lose their support unless he negotiated would have prompted him to negotiate, but Halifax, who did not desire peace, had no motive to issue such a warning. Bonnet urged Beck to accept Hitler’s offer as soon as he heard about it, but he was unable to achieve anything at Warsaw without British support.
Hitler was optimistic because he was completely out of touch with the actual British position represented by Halifax and Kennard despite the efforts of Henderson and Dahlerus. Henderson emphasized to Halifax on the night of August 29th that he had inquired if Germany would negotiate with Poland on a basis of full equality. Hitler had replied promptly and with unmistakable emphasis: “Of course!” Hitler added that he would inform the British Government of his suggestions for a settlement with Poland either shortly before or after the arrival of a Polish emissary. Henderson assured Halifax that these terms would be moderate.
Henderson displayed his usual independence by approaching the Poles in Berlin without waiting for instructions from London. He urged Lipski before midnight on August 29th that Poland could and should send a special envoy to Berlin the following day. Lipski naturally informed Beck of this new development without delay, and the Polish Foreign Minister responded shortly after midnight by calling in Kennard. The British Ambassador was poorly equipped to discuss the situation, because he had received virtually no information from Halifax about the German reply to the British note of August 28th. Beck postponed his discussion with Kennard pending the arrival of adequate information from London.
Halifax had merely informed Kennard that Hitler’s reply “does not appear to close every door.” He might have added that Hitler was trying to open doors rather than to close them, and, above all, he was seeking to open the door slammed by Beck on May 5, 1939. There was a curious air of leisurely detachment in Halifax’s reaction to Hitler’s important offer. Halifax appeared to be more concerned in conveying his unreserved approval of Kennard’s arguments in support of the Polish general mobilization. Halifax made the cynical statement that Great Britain “could not take the responsibility of advising the Polish Government against any action which they consider necessary for their security.” This was really carrying the blank check policy to extremes. It obviously included acceptance of the Polish position that negotiations with the Germans also presented a threat to the security of Poland.
Halifax persisted in adding that the Poles should do everything possible “to avoid advertising” their general mobilization…”
British ambassador in Poland prevents peace talks:
“Halifax passed on to Kennard the full text of the German reply of August 29th shortly after midnight. He restricted himself to the vague comment that the German reply appeared to be not unpromising.
Kennard decided to advise Beck to reject Hitler’s offer for negotiations…He concluded melodramatically that Poland would sooner fight and perish than submit to such humiliation.
The fact that Hitler was willing to negotiate in the face of countless provocations from Poland made no impression on Kennard.
The situation at Warsaw was really quite incredible. Kennard knew that his Government had dishonestly assured Germany on August 28th that Poland was prepared to negotiate seriously with Hitler. Yet, it was unethical of Kennard even under these circumstances to advise Poland not to negotiate. This did not trouble either Halifax or Kennard. Halifax replied to Kennard later on August 30th that the Poles should desist from firing on the German minority, and should make some effort to restrain their reckless radio propaganda, which had been called to his attention at London. He expressed no disapproval of Kennard’s decision to urge Beck not to negotiate with Germany.
There was complete clarity at London, Paris, and Warsaw by the morning of August 30th about the latest German offer to Poland.
Hitler had appealed to the British to advise the Poles to accept direct negotiations with Germany. The British had responded by informing Germany on August 28th that Poland was prepared to negotiate.
Hitler informed Henderson on the following day that he was preparing tentative proposals for a settlement with Poland, and that he wished the British Government to invite Poland to send a special emissary to Berlin on August 30th
The British received an additional assurance shortly afterward that Germany would accept the arrival of a Polish envoy somewhat later than midnight August 30th, and that Berlin had merely been suggested for negotiations. It would be perfectly satisfactory to negotiate at some other place. The many and definite conciliatory steps taken by the German Government to avoid war with Poland during these days actually left very little to be desired.
The Germans on the early morning of August 30th were completely unaware of the situations at London and Warsaw. They did not realize that the August 28th British assurance of Polish readiness to negotiate was an inexcusable hoax. Halifax had neither requested nor received any indication from Poland that the Poles were willing to negotiate on a serious basis. The Germans did not realize that the Polish authorities at Warsaw on August 29th had decided to declare general mobilization on the following day, and that this step had been expressly approved by Halifax. They did not know that the British Ambassador at Warsaw had responded to the German offer to Poland of August 29, 1939, by advising the Poles not to negotiate with Germany. Indeed, Hitler did not suspect that Halifax was doing everything possible to promote war and nothing to prevent it. The German Chancellor would have abandoned his latest hope for a settlement with Poland much earlier had he been aware of the actual situation. It was completely hopeless to invite the Polish Government to negotiate when the British Government was urging them not to do so.
British diplomacy at Warsaw on August 29th and 30th was a dishonorable and mendacious violation of the assurance to Germany in the British note of August 28th. The British Government for several days had fostered the false impression that they favored direct negotiations between Poland and Germany. Their advice to the Poles not to negotiate was an act of brazen duplicity unhappily characteristic of the (Zionist) British diplomatic tradition, which was based on cynical ruthlessness toward friend and foe alike. The excellent opportunity for a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland was destroyed by Halifax’s diplomacy, and the doom of Poland was assured.
The British Government, despite their assurance to Germany on August 28th, had never seriously advised Poland to negotiate. Halifax left Hitler entirely in the dark about this most important item. Hitler naturally assumed that Poland was defying Great Britain by refusing to negotiate, and that Polish defiance would be construed at London as a breach of the Anglo-Polish alliance. He naturally assumed that Poland had broken her engagements to Great Britain by refusing to negotiate with Germany after having first promised to do so. In reality, the contention in the British note of August 28, 1939, that Poland had assured the British Government of her readiness to negotiate was, as we have seen, a deliberate deception. The iniquity of this deception was afterward compounded when the British Government refused to advise Poland to accept negotiations with Germany.
The general mobilization notices were posted throughout Poland by the afternoon of August 30, 1939. The news of this latest Polish challenge to Germany was officially confirmed in a report to Berlin from the German Embassy at Warsaw.
Poland’s own General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had formerly been the chief military collaborator of Pilsudski, told allied journalists four years later that it was the Polish general mobilization order which rendered inevitable the German-Polish war. In retrospect, Sosnkowski insisted that Hitler could do nothing further to avert the war after this event.”
Germany is still unaware on on August 30 that the British are preventing the Poles from negotiating:
“Göring contacted Dahlerus again at 1:15 p.m. after talking to Hitler. The German Marshal first referred to the German proposals, which were now completed. He assured Dahlerus that they were “fabulous (fabelhaft).” He wished to add that there was no intention at Berlin to submit the terms to the Poles for unconditional acceptance, because these proposals were merely intended as a basis for discussion.
Hitler was willing to permit a special representative from Poland to “fetch” the proposals and carry them to Warsaw. Hitler believed that this concession would meet any British objections about undue pressure without denying the Poles an opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to negotiate for a peaceful solution.
Hitler’s thoughtful suggestion was both reasonable and extremely practical, and Göring was pleased with this latest development. He believed that this would remove the last British objection to the specific program for negotiations which had been suggested by Hitler. He was amazed when Dahlerus telephoned at 3:00 p.m. that the British did not like Hitler’s new plan…
The British refusal to consider this vitally important concession came to Göring as an unexpected and discouraging blow.
At one stroke, Berlin’s optimism was challenged by new doubts and fears.
The news about the Polish general mobilization arrived shortly afterward.
The British Prime Minister Chamberlain recognized that the exchange of views between the German and British Governments during the week since August 23rd indicated that Hitler was genuinely desirous of achieving an Anglo-German understanding.
Indeed, this desire on the part of Hitler had been evident to the British leaders for the past six years.
Chamberlain admitted to U.S. ambassador Kennedy that it was the Poles, and not the Germans, who were unreasonable. Kennedy informed President Roosevelt: “frankly he (Chamberlain) is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans.”
Henderson made a number of futile attempts on August 30th to persuade Halifax that a Polish emissary should be sent to Berlin. He reminded Halifax that a Polish diplomat could fly to Berlin from Warsaw in 1 1/2 hours. The British Foreign Secretary refrained from comment, but he informed Henderson that Dahlerus would fly from London to Berlin on the evening of August 30th.
He added that the persistent Swede intended to arrive at the British Embassy before 10:30 p.m. with information about the British response to Hitler’s note of the previous day. Halifax carefully avoided giving any impression that the message would contain hopeful news.
Henderson responded by warning Halifax that outrages against the Germans in Poland were rapidly increasing in number, and that they constituted the most dangerous factor in the existing precarious situation. The British Ambassador suggested that Pope Pius XII would be willing to employ special nuncios in an effort to protect the minority by introducing at least some element of neutral intercession on their behalf. Halifax ignored this suggestion, but he informed Kennard at Warsaw that Great Britain wished to “deprive” Hitler of the excuse of outrages against the German minority as a “pretext” for employing force against Poland. Halifax added that the Polish leader should be urged to maintain “discipline.”
Henderson knew that Halifax was not responding effectively to his warnings about the consequences of Polish misconduct against the Germans. The British Ambassador decided to employ an elaborate argument in an effort to influence Halifax.
He argued that Hitler’s power thrived on the willingness of the outside world to tolerate and ignore the injustices inflicted on the Germans.
He wished Halifax to recognize that Hitler’s position in Germany was being strengthened because of the failure’ to protect the German minority in Poland. He claimed that it would be in the interest of Great Britain to intervene energetically on behalf of the minority, and to promote the settlement of the Corridor problem and the return of Danzig to Germany.
Henderson hoped to be absolved from the possible charge that he was one-sided in his approach, or failed to sympathize with the Poles. His various arguments failed to produce any effect, because Halifax was not interested in the attitude of Henderson toward Poland, and he was definitely hostile toward the project of restricting his campaign against Germany to mere ideological warfare. Halifax wished to discredit Hitler by forcing him to shed German blood in a disastrous war which would end in the defeat and ruination of Germany. Halifax believed that the sole effective method of opposing Hitler was to kill as many Germans as possible. He had employed clever propaganda to convert the majority of his countrymen to the same opinion.”
Press in France makes a last minute push to avert war:
“The French press on August 30, 1939, revealed a far greater interest in preserving peace than in killing Germans. Marcel Pays, the editor of L’Escelsior, pointed out that there would be a good chance for an agreement between Germany and Poland if the British could be prevailed upon to secure the consent of Poland to negotiations. Lucien Bourgues complained in Le Petit Parisien that the issue of peace or war was in doubt because the British were not going far enough in urging a peaceful settlement. Le Jour and L’Echo de Paris agreed that no chance for peace should be missed, no extended hand should be rejected, and no effort should be made to humiliate Germany. Yves Morvan reported for Le Journal from London that Hitler had been moderate and reasonable in his recent talks with the British and French envoys at Berlin. Le Figaro insisted that Hitler’s hesitation during the past six days was “an example of reason” rather than mere “caution, fear, or weakness.” Edith Bricon of La République deplored the fatalism about war in England and Poland, and she insisted upon the need to repeat to everyone concerned that possibilities for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problem still existed. Rene Gounin reminded the readers of La Justice that France was as ready as ever to negotiate with Germany.
French Foreign Minister Bonnet was shocked to learn that the Poles had proceeded to order general mobilization despite his efforts to restrain them. He continued to insist that the Poles send an envoy to Berlin. He requested Halifax to consider a plan to reduce tension by suggesting the withdrawal of German and Polish troops from the positions which both sides were occupying at the frontier. Bonnet failed to enlist the support of Halifax for this proposition, and he discovered that his various measures to influence the Poles were not effective without British support. He could not fail to note the contrast between his own efforts to improve the situation, and the almost complete inaction of Halifax.
French Ambassador Coulondre made a further effort at Berlin on August 30th to impress Lipski with the seriousness of the situation.
He insisted to Lipski that there was great internal opposition in Germany to war against France and Great Britain, and that a small amount of conciliation from the Polish side might make it possible to exploit this situation in order to avoid war,
Coulondre added that there would be no hope at all unless something was done from the Polish side in response to Hitler’s offer. The foreign diplomats at Berlin were in agreement that there was tremendous opposition to war in Germany. American Chargé d’Affaires Alexander C. Kirk flatly asserted in a report to President Roosevelt at 1:00 p.m. on the following day that the German people, like the American people, were opposed to war.”
Britain refuses to advise Poland to negotiate:
“Halifax sent fateful instructions to Henderson at 6:50 p.m. on August 30, 1939, which virtually destroyed the last chance of avoiding a German-Polish war. These instructions contained the British reply to the German note of August 29th. The British leaders categorically rejected Hitler’s proposal that they advise the Poles to send a representative to Berlin for direct German-Polish negotiations. Halifax, who had not consulted Warsaw in this important matter, condemned the German proposal, “which is wholly unreasonable.” It was the unpleasant duty of Henderson to tell Hitler, when the hour of midnight struck, that Great Britain flatly refused to advise the Polish Government to comply with the German plan.
Dahlerus reported on the early evening of August 30th, after discussing the situation with the British leaders, that “it was obvious that by that time the British Government had become highly mistrustful, and rather inclined to assume that whatever efforts they might make, nothing would now prevent Hitler from declaring war on Poland.” It was difficult to understand their mistrust, because they had received an uninterrupted series of encouraging statements about Hitler’s attitude from Henderson and Dahlerus. It was perfectly obvious from the German note of August 29th that Hitler preferred a peaceful settlement with Poland rather than war. The British leaders, in taking this position with Dahlerus, were claiming that they should sit with their hands in their laps and do nothing. There was not the slightest justification for this attitude. They quickly recovered their capacity for action when it became a question of extending a local German-Polish war into a general European war. It appeared that British diplomacy in 1939 was exclusively preoccupied with preparing and promoting war, and that it immediately ceased to function when confronted with the task of protecting the peace.
The British Embassy in Berlin was inundated at this time by Germans of all descriptions and from all walks of life. Henderson was swamped with assurances that the German people did not want war. The British Ambassador was told that there was fear and confusion in German military circles at the prospect of a general war. Other people assured him that they would continue to sympathize with Great Britain no matter what happened as a result of the present British stand. These people did not suspect that the man to whom they were confessing their anxiety no longer had the slightest influence over British policy. Henderson would have helped them by negotiating an understanding with Germany had he been in a position to do so, but he had realized for several days that he was powerless.
No one in the position of the British Ambassador could be blamed for desisting from further efforts to prevent war, but Henderson never stopped trying. It is this fact, combined with his unquestionable British patriotism and his determination to stand by his own country through thick and thin, regardless of the dreadful blunders of the British leaders, that make his mission to Berlin a study in courage. He tried every possible tactic to persuade Chamberlain to express his own views, and to encourage the British Prime Minister to resume leadership at the British Foreign Office before it was too late.”
Roosevelt is deeply concerned that war is taking to long to start and Americans may find out Hitler is the one trying to avoid war, which would create even less support for U.S. involvement in the war, and cause vital Zionist interests [war] to be abandoned:
“Meanwhile The American President insisted that “the most serious danger from the standpoint of American public opinion would be if it formed the conclusion that Herr Hitler was entangling the British Government in negotiations leading to pressure on Poland by England and France to abandon vital interests.”
It was obvious to Lothian that Roosevelt wanted war in Europe.
The American President knew that a diplomatic settlement of the European crisis would extinguish his own plans for American military aggression in Europe…
Lothian knew that Roosevelt would never object to a later effort by Great Britain to massacre the civilian population of Germany by means of mass bombing attacks.
Roosevelt confided to Lothian that his primary objective at the moment was to evade American neutrality legislation after the outbreak of war. He was intent on renewing the struggle in the American Congress to remove the legal embargo on war material.
He promised that he would refuse to admit from the very start of hostilities that aluminum sheets for airplanes were “aeroplane parts” or that airplane engine blocks had anything to do with airplanes. Lothian confirmed the report of his predecessor that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new World War. This warlike attitude of Roosevelt was exploited by Halifax in adducing artificial arguments for closing the door on further negotiations with Hitler. There was actually no reason to fear that President Roosevelt would be in a position to cause trouble for Great Britain in the event of a negotiated settlement in Europe. The American President did not have the support of Congress or public opinion for his aggressive foreign policy, and he was nearing the end of his final presidential term…”
Britain makes a final rejection of German requests for peace talks: Detailed peace plan is read to the British ambassador in Germany:
“Hitler placed high hopes in the news that the British Government intended to reply to his note of the previous
day, before midnight on August 30th.
Henderson was received by Ribbentrop at midnight on August 30th. The fatal British note which Ribbentrop read at once began as follows: “His Majesty’s Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government s desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement.” The British note displayed no interest whatever in persuading the Poles to negotiate with Germany. The German Foreign Minister studied the British reply with dismay.
He informed Henderson after reading the text that the German Government had prepared proposals for a diplomatic settlement with Poland.
The German Foreign Minister proceeded to read slowly and clearly the sixteen points of the German proposals to Poland, and to explain each one of them in detail. The fallacy of the wartime legend about proposals read indistinctly at top speed was exposed after 1945. The German points were comprehensive and formulated with great care.
They requested a mutual Polish-German agreement to protect the rights of the respective minorities. An international tribunal would be established to guarantee the efficacy of this scheme. It would have final jurisdiction in the consideration of appeals. The sixteenth point suggested that Poland and Germany should examine additional means of securing friendly cooperation.
The total extent of the area involved in the German proposals, including the Free City of Danzig and the plebiscite zone, amounted to only one-tenth of the region that Germany had surrendered in the East to Poland and the League of Nations after World War I.”
(They asked for 10% back of what had been stolen 2 decades earlier. Imagine the horror.)
“Dahlerus accompanied Henderson and Ogilvie-Forbes to the Polish Embassy in Berlin at 10:00 a.m. on August 31st. Dahlerus carried his copy of the German proposals, and he read them to Lipski in German. The Swedish engineer received the impression that the Polish Ambassador did not grasp their import, and he left the room to dictate a copy of the note to a Polish secretary. Henderson in the meantime telephoned Weizsäcker at the German Foreign Office that he was advising the Polish Ambassador to negotiate with Germany, and he called this his personal démarche at Warsaw. He proceeded to explain to Lipski that the German proposals offered an excellent basis for a settlement between Germany and Poland. He added that it might still be possible to save the situation if Lipski would agree to receive them.
…Lipski exclaimed to Henderson in great agitation that he “had no reason to negotiate with the German Government. If it came to war between Poland and Germany, he knew — since he had lived 5 1/2 years in Germany — that a revolution would break out in Germany, and that they would march on Berlin.”
Henderson shook his head sadly. He knew that there was no longer any point in discussing the current situation with the Polish Ambassador.
Mussolini, who was not adequately informed about the existing situation, had received the impression from London that Poland had agreed to negotiations. He was soon informed by Mackensen that conditions were entirely different that he had supposed. The Marienwerder proposals were sent to Mackensen in Rome at 10:53 a.m. on August 31st, shortly before the visit of Attolico at the German Foreign Office. Mussolini was impressed with the German plan for a settlement, and he instructed Attolico to advise the German leaders to receive Lipski as a last means of establishing contact. Ribbentrop and Attolico discussed the message on the afternoon of August 31st. The German Foreign Minister assured Attolico that the German leaders were as eager to receive the Polish Ambassador on August 31st as they had been on the previous day.
Kennard informed Halifax on the afternoon of August 31st that Beck had formally expressed his gratitude for the British decision not to respond in any way to the German proposals. French Foreign Minister Bonnet found the dilatory tactics of the Poles unjustifiable and inexplicable. He insisted to Halifax that a joint step should be taken by Great Britain and France to demand that the Poles do something to help save the peace of Europe. The British Foreign Secretary had no desire to save European peace, but he was worried about the French attitude. He calculated that he could make a gesture toward cooperating with the French without running any great risk that the Poles would do something favorable.
He instructed Kennard to join Noël in requesting that the Poles notify the Germans of their willingness to accept direct negotiations. Kennard and Noël accordingly called on Beck in the early afternoon of August 31st and requested that Lipski be authorized to receive the German proposals officially and to relay them to Warsaw for consideration. Kennard was pleased to note that Beck replied evasively that he was not prepared to respond to this request.
Beck had actually dispatched instructions to Lipski shortly before noon to accept no proposals and to enter into no negotiations with the German Government. This telegram had been intercepted and immediately decoded by Göring’s special investigation office. Göring realized at once that the situation was hopeless unless something could be done to change the Polish attitude. He wished the British to know about the Beck telegram because he believed that they might respond by exerting pressure at Warsaw. Göring willingly gave away the fact that Germany possessed Poland’s diplomatic code when he showed the text of this Polish telegram to Dahlerus. The Swedish engineer was shocked by the intransigence of Beck, and he noted that the Germans in turn were extremely agitated by Beck’s communication to Lipski.
Hitler, despite his many worries about the future, could act with a clear conscience. He had offered to negotiate a moderate settlement with the Poles despite months of Polish provocations and savage persecution of the Germans in Poland. It was impossible to deny that he had turned the other cheek to Poland. The Polish refusal to discuss a settlement with Germany on any terms was insulting. The offer to negotiate was actually an offer for an armistice, because there had been no real peace between the two countries for many months.
Hitler did not desire war with Poland, but it was impossible for one nation to keep the peace by means of her own efforts alone. He issued the final attack order at forty minutes past noon, on August 31st. The operations could not conceivably be cancelled again later than 9:30 p.m. on the same day, because the beginning of operations was set for dawn on September 1st. Hitler introduced his order with the following statement: “Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.”
“It is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities (in the West) should rest unequivocally with England and France.”
Henderson continued to advise Halifax throughout the afternoon of August 31st that the German proposals to Poland were moderate, and that they offered an excellent basis for negotiation. The British Foreign Secretary was not impressed by the many appeals for peace which he was receiving from Paris, Rome, and Berlin. As a matter of fact, the British Foreign Office was becoming highly indignant at the tenacity with which the men on the continent, except in Poland, were struggling to preserve the peace.
It was the unfortunate experience of Dahlerus to encounter the full impact of this resentment.
He departed from the conference with Lipski at the Polish Embassy in a spirit of great indignation. It seemed to him incredible that the Poles should he allowed to sabotage a carefully prepared settlement after much good will had been displayed in other quarters.
He now believed that the British would reconsider their decision to support Poland if they were told the truth about the actual situation.
After all the British themselves had first suggested that Germany submit proposals to Poland.
They would surely desist from granting unconditional support to the Poles when they learned that the Polish Government was unwilling to consider the proposals.
Henderson encouraged Dahlerus to telephone London from the British Embassy in Berlin. The Swedish engineer contacted Sir Horace Wilson at the British Foreign Office at 12:30 p.m. on August 31st. He began to describe the situation in detail, and to complain about the Polish attitude. Wilson, like Chamberlain, had capitulated to the war policy of Halifax. He protested that he did not like the tone of Dahlerus’s remarks. He finally claimed that the Swedish engineer had no right to discuss the situation in this way, because the Germans might be listening on the line. This seemed a curious observation to Dahlerus. He saw no reason why the Germans should not hear his remarks, and the British had never before objected to telephone conversations with him over the Embassy line. Wilson began to shout repeatedly to the bewildered Swede: “Shut up!” Wilson concluded his report to Halifax on this incident with the following statement: “I again told Dahlerus to shut up. But as he did not do so I put down the receiver.”
The irritation of the British Foreign Office was no temporary mood, and the wrath of Halifax soon descended upon Henderson. The British Ambassador received several reprimands in very strong language for permitting Dahlerus to use the telephone. These reprimands were unjust, because Henderson had received instructions from London to extend the use of Embassy facilities to Dahlerus, and no instructions to the contrary had been received at the time of the unpleasant incident at 12:30 p.m. on August 31st.
Kennard reported at 3:20 p.m. that the Polish Government was taking steps to contact the German Government, but “will not agree to accept a document containing a demand until methods of procedure have been agreed to.” The Polish Government might as well have announced that it intended to contact the moon. The British and Poles had conspired to make a complete farce of the negotiation plan supported by
Germany, Italy, France, and Pope Pius XII.
Kennard had assured Beck privately after the Anglo-French démarche that the British Government did not
actually wish Lipski to receive the German proposals, and that the formal step at Warsaw had been a gesture of appeasement to France.
He asked Halifax if he should inform Beck “what we know” of the contents of the proposals, but he was obviously reluctant to do so.
Kennard was not aware that Beck had received the text of the German proposals from Lipski many hours earlier. His only fear was that there might be a last minute peaceful solution instead of the war which he and Halifax desired.
Ribbentrop received Lipski at 6:30 p.m. on August 31st. The Polish Ambassador read the contents of a note from Beck. The note stated [falsely] that Poland had just now received word about the recent talks between Great Britain and Germany which had started on August 23rd.
The attitude of the Polish Government toward eventual talks between Poland and Germany had not been decided, but it was favorable in principle, and the German Government was informed that the Polish Government would soon indicate to the British Government its attitude toward such talks. Beck was not prepared to give the Germans an assurance that Poland was actually willing to renew negotiations with Germany.
Ribbentrop listened sadly to the senseless double-talk of the Polish note, which Beck undoubtedly considered sufficiently clever and misleading to confuse the Germans.
Ribbentrop told Lipski that he had hoped until the last minute that he would be empowered to negotiate. Lipski explained that he had been instructed merely to call on Ribbentrop and to present the Polish note. He was not allowed to give any personal assurances, or to make any statements. It is not surprising under these circumstances that the interview was a short one. Ribbentrop concluded the interview by asking if Lipski personally believed that his Government might reconsider its decision and permit him to negotiate. The Polish diplomat evaded this question by repeating that he had not received plenary powers.”
German peace proposals read on radio broadcast:
“The German radio broadcast to the world at 9:00 p.m. on August 31st the Marienwerder proposals which Poland had refused to consider. Weizsäcker also presented the Marienwerder terms to the British, French, Japanese, American, and Russian diplomatic representatives at Berlin between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on August 31st. The terms were accompanied in each instance by a diplomatic note which explained recent German policy. The main emphasis was on the fact that Hitler had waited in vain for two days to receive an indication that Poland would negotiate with Germany, although the British on August 28th had assured him that Poland was prepared to negotiate.
The Polish radio broadcast a distorted version of the German offer two hours later. It offered the world a glimpse of the mentality which was being encountered by the helpless German minority in Poland. The Polish broadcaster argued that the Germans in their proposals had revealed their aggressive intentions, and he concluded with the following statement:
“Words can now no longer veil the aggressive plans of the new Huns. Germany is aiming at the domination of Europe and is canceling the rights of nations with as yet unprecedented cynicism. This impudent proposal shows clearly how necessary were the military orders (general mobilization) given by the Polish Government.”
The breakdown in relations was complete so far as Germany and Poland were concerned.
Hitler had failed in his effort to win Poland as a stalwart Slavic ally against Bolshevism, and this in itself was a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude.
German military operations commenced five hours later. Polish resistance began to crumble within a few days under the well-aimed German blows.
The local German-Polish war need not have disturbed the peace of Europe for more than a few weeks.
It would have been far easier for foreign Powers to intervene effectively to ameliorate the lot of the Poles, at least within the German area of occupation, had the war remained limited. The restoration of peace in Poland would have been an immediate concern, rather than some distant eventuality. Poland twenty years later is a Communist satellite of the Soviet Union. It would be impossible to imagine a result more distasteful to the Polish leaders who recklessly plunged Poland into a hopeless war against Germany in 1939. Their grandiose hopes and dreams of a new Great Poland remained unrealized, and their people were subjected to the worst possible fate.
Halifax did everything possible to encourage the desperate Polish challenge to Germany which resulted in the permanent domination of Poland by the Soviet Union.”
Other books include:
“Polish Atrocities Against The German Minority In Poland” Hans Schadewaldt (includes photos in zdoc)
” Hitler’s War” David Irving
“The Image of the Germans in Polish Literature” Else Loser
“President Roosevelt’s Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents” Mark Weber
“Back Door to War” G.C. Tansill
“What the World Rejected: Hitler’s Peace Offers” Friedrich Stieve
Although The Forced War provides the greatest detail on the events taking place in Europe, other books such as Back Door to War and President Roosevelt’s Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents reveal that the strongest influence came from President Roosevelt, who constantly pushed Britain and France with assurances America would support them 100%. Essentially the British guarantee to Poland, was the American guarantee to Poland.